by R AssociatesJuly 22, 2026 Recent News0 comments

APTEL upholds that Delay in Securing Long-Term Access (LTA) is not a valid Force Majeure and therefore, Scheduled Delivery Date under PPA cannot be unilaterally extended

In a judgment dated 03.07.2026 in Appeal No.183 of 2020, the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (Appellate Tribunal) has dismissed the appeal filed by Maruti Clean Coal and Power Limited (MCCPL), thereby upholding the Order dated 27.11.2019 passed by the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (Central Commission). The Appellate Tribunal has ruled in favour of the Rajasthan Discoms — Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited, Ajmer Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited and Jodhpur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited and Rajasthan Urja Vikas Nigam Limited (RUVNL), rejecting MCCPL’s claim that the Scheduled Delivery Date (SDD) of 30.11.2016 fixed under the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) stood revised to 01.04.2017, and that the first contract year for tariff purposes ought to be reckoned from the later date.

1. Delay of Two Years in seeking Long-Term Access cannot be termed as Force Majeure

MCCPL had attributed its inability to supply the full Aggregate Contracted Capacity of 250 MW by the SDD on the non-operationalization of Long-Term Access (LTA)/Medium-Term Open Access (MTOA), and sought to characterise this as a Force Majeure event under the PPA. The Appellate Tribunal rejected this contention. It noted that after submitting a LTA revision request, MCCPL “just adopted a wait and watch approach” and neither sent any reminder to PGCIL/CTU nor made any other effort to ensure that LTA for the full 250 MW was granted expeditiously, following up only on 13.08.2015, after its plant had already achieved Commercial Operation Date. The fresh LTA application, mandated because the change in target region exceeded 100 MW under the Connectivity Regulations, 2009, was filed over two years after the PPA was signed.

The Appellate Tribunal found no merit in MCCPL’s plea that this delay was attributable to “legal uncertainty and procedural ambiguity” on account of the methodology for calculating relinquishement charges pending before the Central Commission. It held that the fifth proviso to Regulation 12(1) of the Connectivity Regulations, 2009 “clearly provided that a fresh LTA application would be required” for a change exceeding 100 MW or a change of region, and the order on relinquishement charges passed by the Central Commission “only elaborates and explains” what the proviso already provided, without effecting any change in the regulatory position. Since Force Majeure grants relief only where the triggering event “could not have been avoided if the affected party had taken reasonable care or complied with prudent utility practices,” the Appellate Tribunal held that MCCPL “neither took reasonable care nor acted prudently” in pursuing its LTA request.

2. Commencement of supply “Upto” Aggregate Contracted Capacity does not require the entire quantum of electricity flowing

MCCPL’s case was that the SDD stood fulfilled only when the entire 250 MW commenced flowing, and that part supply of 45 MW alone on 30.11.2016 could not amount to commencement of supply under the PPA. The Appellate Tribunal disagreed, construing Article 4.1.1 and Article 4.2.1(b) together. It held that the expression “upto the Aggregated Contracted Capacity” indicates that “the seller may commence supply of power of any quantum, the maximum limit being the aggregated contracted capacity,” and that it was “not mandatory for the power generator i.e. the seller to supply the entire aggregated contracted capacity of power by the Scheduled Delivery Date i.e. 30.11.2016 in order to constitute commencement of supply of power.”

The Apellate Tribunal noted that MCCPL had itself served the advance preliminary notice (26.09.2016) and final written notice (27.10.2016) under Article 4.1.2 for commencement of supply “w.e.f 30.11.2016 i.e scheduled delivery date,” raised monthly invoices at the tariff payable for the first contract year, which were duly paid, and never conveyed to the Discoms that the SDD should be treated as suspended, split into phases, or held in abeyance pending availability of transmission capacity for the balance 205 MW. On this basis, the AppellateTribunal held that the supply of 45 MW from 30.11.2016 itself constituted “commencement of supply” under Article 4.1.1, and that the first Contract Year commenced from that date.

3. No Force Majeure event affected CTU, LTA was, in Fact, Operationalized ahead of Schedule

The Appellate Tribunal also rejected MCCPL’s reliance on Article 9.2.2, which deems a Force Majeure event affecting CTU/STU to be a Force Majeure event affecting the Seller. It observed that the 23rd Meeting of WR Constituents had recorded that the Champa-Kurukshetra HVDC Phase-I and Phase-II lines, and the Jabalpur-Orai line, were expected to be commissioned only in November 2016/March 2018 and April 2018 respectively, yet MCCPL’s LTA was in fact operationalized on 31.03.2017, “almost one year earlier” than the timeline earlier communicated by PGCIL. In these circumstances, the Appellate Tribunal held, “it cannot be said that there was any force majeure event affecting the PGCIL/CTU for providing transmission access to the appellant.”

4. Deliberate delay in Furnishing the Letter of Credit

The Appellate Tribunal found that even after the Champa-Kurukshetra line achieved Commercial Operation on 24.03.2017 and PGCIL/CTU called upon MCCPL on the same date to furnish a Letter of Credit (LC), MCCPL offered “no justification” for the delay in submitting the LC until 31.03.2017, resulting in commencement of the balance 205 MW supply only from 01.04.2017. The Appellate Tribunal held that this appeared to be a deliberate delay with an “ulterior motive,” observing that had supply commenced on any date between 24.03.2017 and 01.04.2017, the first contract year “would have been merely of a few days,” which MCCPL avoided so as to secure the higher first-contract-year tariff of Rs.1.633/kWh (as against Rs.1.558/kWh for the second Contract Year) for a full twelve-month period. The Appellate Tribunal termed such conduct “not acceptable.”

Conclusion

Holding that neither the delay in operationalization of LTA nor the timing of supply of the balance 205 MW was covered by Force Majeure under the PPA, and that commencement of supply of 45 MW on 30.11.2016 itself marked the beginning of the first contract year, the Appellate Tribunal answered both issues framed for its consideration against MCCPL. Finding no error or infirmity in the Impugned Order, the Appellate Tribunal dismissed Appeal No.183 of 2020, reaffirming that Scheduled Delivery Dates fixed under a PPA cannot be unilaterally shifted by a generator based on its own commercial convenience, and that claims of Force Majeure must be tested strictly against the diligence or lack thereof shown by the party invoking it.

Judgment Link

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by R AssociatesJune 30, 2025 Articles0 comments

APTEL Tightens the Screws on Public Interest Litigation: Strict Locus Standi Now Mandatory in Electricity Matters

I. Introduction

The Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (“APTEL”) reaffirmed in its April 8, 2025 judgment that public interest organizations must comply with stringent statutory locus standi criteria under the Electricity Act, 2003 (“Act”) when challenging regulatory orders. Mere altruistic intent does not equate to legal standing.

This analysis assesses APTEL’s ruling—its legal reasoning, statutory underpinnings, and broader implications for public-interest litigation in the power sector.

II. Statutory & Regulatory Framework

  1. Section 2(15) defines “consumer” as any person supplied electricity for his own use.
  2. Section 111 permits appeals before APTEL by “any person aggrieved” by orders of Appropriate Commissions.
  3. The CERC/State ERC Conduct of Business Regulations often allow consumer representation but require formal legal standing, not just goodwill.

Section 111’s qualifier—“aggrieved”—imposes both legal injury and direct effect requirements.

III. Facts: Review by Surat Citizens Council Trust

  • APTEL had earlier dismissed Appeal No 341 of 2017, where the Surat Citizens Council Trust challenged tariff orders by GERC, alleging broad public harm.
  • The Trust was not a direct consumer and lacked mandates in its object clause to represent tariff payers.
  • The Trust periodically obtained RTI information and audit data, but did not hold consumer status.

It approached APTEL via a review petition, invoking public interest and systemic grievances—a plea the Tribunal firmly rejected.

IV. APTEL’s Legal Findings

  1. Strict Statutory Standing: Under Section 2(15), absence of consumer status meant the Trust was not “aggrieved” under Section 111.
  2. No Representative Authority: Its governing documents included no mandate to represent affected consumers.
  3. No Direct Injury: Lacked evidence showing tariff harm, either personal or through members.
  4. Public Interest Alone Insufficient: Motivations, however noble, cannot replace statutory prerequisites.
  5. Inadmissible Review Relief: Review petitions cannot re-litigate merits beyond correcting “error apparent on face.” The Trust’s new submissions were too late and not ground for review.

V. Judicial Reasoning: Public Interest vs. Legal Standing

APTEL drew a clear distinction between:

  • Abstract or derivative harm, which is inadmissible; and
  • Concrete, direct legal injury, which satisfies locus standi.

The Tribunal cited precedent from both electricity law and general administrative law to clarify that mere public spiritedness cannot override statutory architecture. In particular, it relied on the legal position in:

  • Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, (1976) 1 SCC 671 – wherein the Supreme Court rejected “busybody” litigants lacking direct grievance.
  • PTC India Ltd. v. CERC, (2010) 4 SCC 603 – which defined the scope of regulatory jurisdiction and clarified statutory appellate paths under the Electricity Act.

The ruling squarely rejected the notion that public interest is a standalone ground for approaching APTEL without complying with the substantive requirements of the Act.

VI. Procedural Takeaways

The Tribunal provided guidance for public interest groups wishing to approach electricity tribunals:

  1. Object Clause Alignment: The organization’s charter must show a clear mandate to represent electricity consumers or affected stakeholders.
  2. Proof of Injury or Representation: Entities must demonstrate:
    • A direct relationship to the impugned order; or
    • Authorization from identified consumer groups.
  3. Participatory Prerequisite: Participation in the original regulatory proceedings before the SERC or CERC is essential. Post-facto intervention is rarely permitted.
  4. No Collateral Appeals: Entities cannot repackage generalized grievances to reopen decisions already adjudicated.

This procedural discipline preserves the limited judicial bandwidth of APTEL for truly aggrieved persons, ensuring that regulatory stability is not undermined by unvetted interventions.

VII. Policy Context: Rise in NGO and Trust Interventions

In recent years, several NGOs, citizen forums, and local trusts have begun using the Electricity Act’s appeal provisions to challenge tariff orders, PPAs, and procurement guidelines—often citing environmental or public affordability concerns.

While such interventions can add valuable perspective, APTEL’s ruling underscores that such efforts must be institutionally disciplined. Courts and tribunals cannot act as policy forums or oversight bodies unless approached by legally competent persons or groups.

VIII. Impact on Public Interest Litigation in the Power Sector

The APTEL judgment will likely curb indiscriminate filing of appeals and reviews by public interest organizations that do not meet the minimum statutory thresholds. Key implications include:

a) Enhanced Gatekeeping

Electricity sector regulators and tribunals will adopt a stricter filter while examining the maintainability of petitions filed in the name of public interest. This ensures judicial economy, reduces backlog, and preserves the integrity of sectoral adjudication.

b) Higher Compliance Burden on NGOs

Organizations seeking to represent consumer interests in tariff matters must now align their incorporation documents, obtain mandates from affected groups, and demonstrate direct or representative standing. Casual or peripheral involvement will no longer suffice.

c) Clarity on Review Jurisdiction

The judgment also clarifies the limited scope of review under APTEL’s procedural rules. Review petitions are not a substitute for appeal, and any attempt to reopen findings without pointing to an evident error or omission will be summarily dismissed.

d) Sectoral Certainty

The ruling stabilizes regulatory processes in the electricity sector by preventing ad hoc disruption of commission decisions via loosely framed PIL-type reviews. This is especially important in tariff fixation and grid planning, where long-term investments depend on regulatory predictability.

IX. Comparative Jurisprudence

The Tribunal’s approach aligns with the principles upheld in:

  • Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary, (1992) 4 SCC 305 – holding that “public interest litigation is not a license for irresponsible litigation”.
  • Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of West Bengal, (2004) 3 SCC 349 – where the Supreme Court cautioned against abuse of PIL to serve personal or political ends.

The power sector’s regulatory adjudication thus continues to follow the broader judicial movement toward structured, merit-based public litigation, discouraging speculative or ideologically motivated filings.

Conclusion

The April 2025 decision of APTEL in the Surat Citizens Council Trust matter marks a pivotal clarification in the domain of regulatory litigation. While it does not exclude public interest entities altogether, it mandates rigorous compliance with statutory locus standi.

This ruling preserves the integrity of the appellate framework under the Electricity Act, 2003 by ensuring that only persons with direct legal grievance or properly authorized representation may invoke appellate jurisdiction. In doing so, APTEL has drawn a necessary and constitutionally valid line between participatory governance and judicial intervention.

Going forward, electricity regulatory litigation in India will need to reflect structured advocacy, institutional mandate, and demonstrable harm—lest it be struck down at the threshold.

APTEL – Surat Citizens Council Trust (Review Petition No. 1 of 2025 in Appeal No. 341 of 2017) – https://aptel.gov.in/sites/default/files/2025-04/RP%201%20of%202025%20.pdf?

Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed & Ors. (1975) – https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1749406/

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