APTEL Sets Aside APERC’s Deduction of Variable Charges for Monthly Availability Shortfall: Energy Charges Cannot Be Penalised

The Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (“Appellate Tribunal”) in its judgment dated 03.07.2026, has ruled in favour of Hinduja National Power Corporation Limited (“HNPCL”), setting aside the order dated 30.12.2025 passed by the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission (“APERC”), to the extent it directed deductions from HNPCL’s variable charges on account of shortfall in monthly plant availability.

By allowing Appeal No. 27 of 2026, the Appellate Tribunal has held that under the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (Terms and Conditions of Tariff) Regulations, 2024, the APERC Regulations of 2008, and the Power Purchase Agreement (“PPA”) dated 16.07.2024 executed between the parties, only fixed/capacity charges are linked to plant availability, while energy charges are strictly linked to the scheduled energy actually supplied and cannot be reduced or penalised for a shortfall in monthly availability.

1. No Statutory or Contractual Basis for Deducting Variable Charges

APERC by way of the Impugned Order had directed the DISCOMs to apply graded deductions from the Variable Cost – 5paise per unit where the shortfall in actual monthly availability was up to 5% below the normative/target level, 10paise where the shortfall was between 5% and 15%, and 15paise where the shortfall exceeded 15%, with liberty to HNPCL to seek release of the withheld amounts by establishing that the underperformance was attributable to uncontrollable factors.

HNPCL contended that neither the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (Terms and Conditions of Tariff) Regulations, 2024 (adopted by APERC), nor the APERC Regulations, 2008, nor the PPA provide for any reduction in energy charges on account of a shortfall in availability, and that the deductions were consequently without statutory or contractual authority. HNCPL contended that Rs. 12.26 Crore had already been withheld from HNPCL’s bills for the months of December 2025 to February 2026.

2. Fixed Charges, Not Energy Charges, are Linked to Availability

Examining Regulation 15 and 16 read with Chapter 11 of the CERC Regulations, 2024, Clause 1.2.2 and 1.2.3 of Schedule-F of the PPA, and Regulations 11 to 13 of the APERC Regulations, 2008, the Appellate Tribunal held that the governing framework, whether under the CERC Regulations, the APERC Regulations, or the PPA executed between the parties expressly and unambiguously stipulates that monthly fixed charges are linked to the Plant Availability Factor for the month vis-à-vis the normative annual plant availability, whereas energy charges are linked solely to the fuel cost/energy charge rate applied to the quantum of energy actually supplied during the month, irrespective of the plant availability achieved in that month.

The Appellate Tribunal held that once the Regulations stipulate the manner of recovery of fixed cost and computation of energy charge, APERC has no jurisdiction to interfere with or modify that scheme by way of adjudication or in a tariff order, any departure can only be effected by way of a formal amendment to the Regulations, and not otherwise.

3. APERC cannot invoke Casus Omissus to fill a regulatory gap that does not exist

APERCS had contended that while the PPA and Regulations focus on annual normative availability, they do not preclude monthly adjustments, and that APERC, as a statutory body, is empowered and obligated to fill contractual and regulatory gaps to ensure reliable supply.

The Appellate Tribunal rejected this submission, holding that both the CERC and APERC Regulations clearly stipulate the methodology for recovery of energy charges for a given month, and once such methodology is prescribed, the Commission is bound to apply it in its entirety. The doctrine of casus omissus was held to have no application, since the Regulations are complete in themselves and leave no vacuum for the Commission to legislate by way of adjudication.

4. Parity with other generators cannot justify an unlawful deduction

APERC had sought to justify the deductions by referring to similar reductions applied to other Intra-State generators such as APGENCO. The Appellate Tribunal held that the application of a similar reduction to other generators is of no relevance, since those orders were not under challenge and the Appellate Tribunal was not bound to extend the same treatment to HNPCL merely because it had been applied elsewhere. The doctrine of “negative equality” or parity cannot be invoked to perpetuate an illegality or justify a deviation from the Regulations, and each appeal must be adjudicated on the basis of the statutory framework and the specific impugned order under consideration.

Accordingly, the Appellate Tribunal set aside the Impugned Order on this issue and directed that recovery of energy charges be enforced strictly in accordance with the applicable CERC Regulations and the PPA, with the Respondents directed to refund the amount deducted/withheld from HNPCL’s energy bills along with applicable carrying cost within four weeks from the date of the judgment.

5. Part load compensation, remanded for quantification only

HNPCL had also claimed Part Load Compensation (“PLC”) in terms of Clause 1.2.5 of Schedule-F of the PPA read with Regulation 6.3B of the CERC [Indian Electricity Grid Code(IEGC)] (Fourth Amendment) Regulations, 2016, on which the Impugned Order contained no discussion, analysis or finding, despite APERC having recorded HNPCL’s claim. The DISCOMs admitted that the Revised Consolidated PPA explicitly provides for part load compensation, but contended that no separate determination was required as PLC for the previous Control Period had been claimed as part of the True-Up process on an actual basis.

Finding no dispute with regard to HNPCL’s entitlement to Part Load Compensation, and noting that the controversy, if any, was confined only to quantification and reconciliation, the Appellate Tribunal held that HNPCL is entitled to Part Load Compensation in terms of the PPA and Regulation 6.3B of the IEGC (Fourth Amendment), 2016, and remanded the matter to APERC for determination and finalisation of the amount payable towards PLC.

The judgment reaffirms that in a statutory tariff regime, the mechanism prescribed under the Regulations and the PPA for recovery of fixed and energy charges must be followed strictly. It further clarifies that the doctrine of casus omissus cannot be invoked to fill a gap where none exists, and that parity with the treatment accorded to unrelated generators cannot be used to sustain an otherwise unlawful deduction.

Judgement Link:

APTEL upholds that Delay in Securing Long-Term Access (LTA) is not a valid Force Majeure and therefore, Scheduled Delivery Date under PPA cannot be unilaterally extended

In a judgment dated 03.07.2026 in Appeal No.183 of 2020, the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (Appellate Tribunal) has dismissed the appeal filed by Maruti Clean Coal and Power Limited (MCCPL), thereby upholding the Order dated 27.11.2019 passed by the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (Central Commission). The Appellate Tribunal has ruled in favour of the Rajasthan Discoms — Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited, Ajmer Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited and Jodhpur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited and Rajasthan Urja Vikas Nigam Limited (RUVNL), rejecting MCCPL’s claim that the Scheduled Delivery Date (SDD) of 30.11.2016 fixed under the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) stood revised to 01.04.2017, and that the first contract year for tariff purposes ought to be reckoned from the later date.

1. Delay of Two Years in seeking Long-Term Access cannot be termed as Force Majeure

MCCPL had attributed its inability to supply the full Aggregate Contracted Capacity of 250 MW by the SDD on the non-operationalization of Long-Term Access (LTA)/Medium-Term Open Access (MTOA), and sought to characterise this as a Force Majeure event under the PPA. The Appellate Tribunal rejected this contention. It noted that after submitting a LTA revision request, MCCPL “just adopted a wait and watch approach” and neither sent any reminder to PGCIL/CTU nor made any other effort to ensure that LTA for the full 250 MW was granted expeditiously, following up only on 13.08.2015, after its plant had already achieved Commercial Operation Date. The fresh LTA application, mandated because the change in target region exceeded 100 MW under the Connectivity Regulations, 2009, was filed over two years after the PPA was signed.

The Appellate Tribunal found no merit in MCCPL’s plea that this delay was attributable to “legal uncertainty and procedural ambiguity” on account of the methodology for calculating relinquishement charges pending before the Central Commission. It held that the fifth proviso to Regulation 12(1) of the Connectivity Regulations, 2009 “clearly provided that a fresh LTA application would be required” for a change exceeding 100 MW or a change of region, and the order on relinquishement charges passed by the Central Commission “only elaborates and explains” what the proviso already provided, without effecting any change in the regulatory position. Since Force Majeure grants relief only where the triggering event “could not have been avoided if the affected party had taken reasonable care or complied with prudent utility practices,” the Appellate Tribunal held that MCCPL “neither took reasonable care nor acted prudently” in pursuing its LTA request.

2. Commencement of supply “Upto” Aggregate Contracted Capacity does not require the entire quantum of electricity flowing

MCCPL’s case was that the SDD stood fulfilled only when the entire 250 MW commenced flowing, and that part supply of 45 MW alone on 30.11.2016 could not amount to commencement of supply under the PPA. The Appellate Tribunal disagreed, construing Article 4.1.1 and Article 4.2.1(b) together. It held that the expression “upto the Aggregated Contracted Capacity” indicates that “the seller may commence supply of power of any quantum, the maximum limit being the aggregated contracted capacity,” and that it was “not mandatory for the power generator i.e. the seller to supply the entire aggregated contracted capacity of power by the Scheduled Delivery Date i.e. 30.11.2016 in order to constitute commencement of supply of power.”

The Apellate Tribunal noted that MCCPL had itself served the advance preliminary notice (26.09.2016) and final written notice (27.10.2016) under Article 4.1.2 for commencement of supply “w.e.f 30.11.2016 i.e scheduled delivery date,” raised monthly invoices at the tariff payable for the first contract year, which were duly paid, and never conveyed to the Discoms that the SDD should be treated as suspended, split into phases, or held in abeyance pending availability of transmission capacity for the balance 205 MW. On this basis, the AppellateTribunal held that the supply of 45 MW from 30.11.2016 itself constituted “commencement of supply” under Article 4.1.1, and that the first Contract Year commenced from that date.

3. No Force Majeure event affected CTU, LTA was, in Fact, Operationalized ahead of Schedule

The Appellate Tribunal also rejected MCCPL’s reliance on Article 9.2.2, which deems a Force Majeure event affecting CTU/STU to be a Force Majeure event affecting the Seller. It observed that the 23rd Meeting of WR Constituents had recorded that the Champa-Kurukshetra HVDC Phase-I and Phase-II lines, and the Jabalpur-Orai line, were expected to be commissioned only in November 2016/March 2018 and April 2018 respectively, yet MCCPL’s LTA was in fact operationalized on 31.03.2017, “almost one year earlier” than the timeline earlier communicated by PGCIL. In these circumstances, the Appellate Tribunal held, “it cannot be said that there was any force majeure event affecting the PGCIL/CTU for providing transmission access to the appellant.”

4. Deliberate delay in Furnishing the Letter of Credit

The Appellate Tribunal found that even after the Champa-Kurukshetra line achieved Commercial Operation on 24.03.2017 and PGCIL/CTU called upon MCCPL on the same date to furnish a Letter of Credit (LC), MCCPL offered “no justification” for the delay in submitting the LC until 31.03.2017, resulting in commencement of the balance 205 MW supply only from 01.04.2017. The Appellate Tribunal held that this appeared to be a deliberate delay with an “ulterior motive,” observing that had supply commenced on any date between 24.03.2017 and 01.04.2017, the first contract year “would have been merely of a few days,” which MCCPL avoided so as to secure the higher first-contract-year tariff of Rs.1.633/kWh (as against Rs.1.558/kWh for the second Contract Year) for a full twelve-month period. The Appellate Tribunal termed such conduct “not acceptable.”

Conclusion

Holding that neither the delay in operationalization of LTA nor the timing of supply of the balance 205 MW was covered by Force Majeure under the PPA, and that commencement of supply of 45 MW on 30.11.2016 itself marked the beginning of the first contract year, the Appellate Tribunal answered both issues framed for its consideration against MCCPL. Finding no error or infirmity in the Impugned Order, the Appellate Tribunal dismissed Appeal No.183 of 2020, reaffirming that Scheduled Delivery Dates fixed under a PPA cannot be unilaterally shifted by a generator based on its own commercial convenience, and that claims of Force Majeure must be tested strictly against the diligence or lack thereof shown by the party invoking it.

Judgment Link

APTEL directs the Central Commission to exercise Power to Relax in relation O&M Norms for Sole North-Eastern Transmission Licensee

In a judgment dated 08.07.2026, the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (“Appellate Tribunal”) has ruled in favour of North East Transmission Company Limited (“NETCL”), setting aside the Order dated 27.01.2021 passed by the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (“Central Commission”) in Petition No. 191/MP/2019, whereby the Central Commission had declined to exercise its power to relax the normative Operation and Maintenance (“O&M”) expenses prescribed under the Tariff Regulations, 2014.

By allowing Appeal No. 296 of 2021, the Appellate Tribunal has remanded the matter to the Central Commission with a specific direction to exercise its power to relax under Regulation 54 of the Tariff Regulations, 2014, for the limited purpose of working out the O&M charges for NETCL’s transmission assets for the control period 2014-19.

Brief Background

NETCL, a single-project transmission licensee engaged in evacuating power from the 2 x 363.3 MW Palatana Gas Based Power Project of ONGC Tripura Power Company Limited across five transmission assets in the North-Eastern Region, had relied on the Central Commission’s ownearlier order dated 16.04.2019, wherein the Central Commission had observed that NETCL, being a single asset company operating in the North-Eastern Region, “required consideration distinct from transmission licensees having multiple assets” and had granted liberty to file a fresh petition. NETCL contended that the Impugned Order, passed pursuant to that very liberty, contradicted the Central Commission’s earlier observation.

The Appellate Tribunal in the Appeal has proceeded to decide the issue on merits rather than resting its decision on the earlier order passed by the Central Commission alone.

1. Pan-India Normative Benchmark cannot be considered for Higher O&M costs of the North-East

NETCL demonstrated, relying on POWERGRID’s region-wise O&M data for 2014-15 drawn from the Statement of Reasons to the Tariff Regulations, 2014, that the North-Eastern Regionconstituting merely 3.25% of POWERGRID’s pan-India network of over 1,53,635 circuit kilometres incurred O&M costs of Rs. 0.75 lakh per circuit kilometre, which is 127% higher than the Western Region, 32% higher than the Northern Region and 79% higher than the Southern Region. It was NETCL’s case that when such costs are aggregated at the national level to derive a single normative benchmark of Rs. 0.403 lakh per circuit kilometre, the distinctly higher costs of the North-East get diluted within the national average, even though NETCL operates entirely within that region.

The Appellate Tribunal held that for a transmission licensee operating on a pan-India basis, aberrations in regional O&M costs can be mitigated when evaluated at the company level, but “the same mitigation is not feasible for a licensee whose operations are confined solely to the North Eastern Region, such as the Appellant”. The Appellate Tribunal also took note of NETCL’s submission that the rates independently determined for State Commission-regulated utilities operating under identical conditions in the region Rs. 0.85 lakh per circuit kilometre for AEGCL (Assam) and Rs. 1.09 lakh per circuit kilometre for MEPTCL (Meghalaya) were approximately twice the normative rate applied to NETCL.

2. Finding on Non-Submission of Data

The Impugned Order had recorded that NETCL“failed to submit data regarding O&M expenses while the Central Commission was engaged in formulating the norms for the control period 2019-24”. NETCL disputed this finding, pointing out that it had, in fact, submitted detailed operational and financial data in response to the Central Commission’s Public Notice dated 10.11.2017 inviting stakeholder comments on the Draft Tariff Regulations, 2019.

On scrutiny of the record, the Appellate Tribunal found substance in NETCL’s contention and held that the observation in the Impugned Order that no data was submitted by NETCL for finalising the O&M norms for the control period 2019-24 is contrary to the record and cannot be sustained, and accordingly set aside the Central Commission’s finding on this aspect.

3. Subsequent recognition of the North-East’s Operational challenges in the Central Commission Tariff Regulations

The Appellate Tribunal noted that the Central Commission has taken cognizance of the difficulties faced by licensees operating in the North-Eastern and hilly regions. The Explanatory Memorandum to the Draft Tariff Regulations, 2024 records that “the actual expenses incurred in the NER region are higher than compared to other regions” on account of increased logistic, erection, labour and transportation costs, and proposes a multiplication factor of 1.5 to the O&M expenses for licensees whose transmission assets are located solely in the North-Eastern Region, Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh, and the Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh, a dispensation since incorporated as a proviso to Regulation 36(3) of the Tariff Regulations, 2024.

The Appellate Tribunal directed that while working out the O&M charges for NETCL on remand, the Central Commission shall also take into account this special dispensation accorded in the subsequent regulations for hilly and similarly placed licensees in the North-Eastern Region.

4. Exceptional circumstances justify exercise of the Power to Relax under the Tariff Regulations

The Appellate Tribunal held that Regulation 54 of the Tariff Regulations, 2014 confers on the Central Commission the power to relax any provision of the Regulations in exceptional circumstances, to be exercised not lightly or routinely, but where the factual matrix discloses circumstances of such peculiar nature that strict adherence to the regulatory norm would result in manifest hardship or inequity. Finding that NETCL’s operations are confined exclusively to the North-Eastern Region, characterised by hilly terrain, difficult accessibility and operational challenges not ordinarily encountered elsewhere, the Appellate Tribunal held that these constitute exceptional circumstances within the meaning of Regulation 54, and that “to insist upon a rigid application of the normative O&M charges in such a situation would be inequitable and contrary to the statutory mandate of ensuring reasonable recovery of costs”.

Accordingly, the Impugned Order was set aside and the matter remanded to the Central Commission with a direction to exercise its power to relax under Regulation 54 for working out NETCL’s O&M charges for the control period 2014-19, subject to a prudence check ensuring that only expenditure which is demonstrably necessary and reasonable is factored into the determination.

The judgment reaffirms that normative benchmarks derived on a pan-India basis cannot be mechanically applied to licensees whose operations are confined to regions with demonstrably higher operating costs, and underscores the availability of the power to relax as a corrective mechanism for such licensees operating under peculiar geographical and operational constraints.

Judgement Link

CERC Orders Refund of ₹711.44 Crore to Haryana Discoms in Transmission Charges Dispute; Recognises Entitlement to Interest

In an order dated 28.02.2026, the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC), on remand, has ruled in favour of the Haryana Discoms (UHBVNL and DHBVNL, through HPPC), directing refund of ₹711.44 crore along with applicable interest, in relation to transmission charges wrongly levied by Grid India.

This order marks the culmination of prolonged litigation spanning multiple rounds before the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (APTEL) and the CERC, concerning the classification and charging of the 400 kV IGSTPS–Daulatabad transmission line.

1. Recognition of Intra-State Nature of Transmission Line

At the core of the dispute was whether the 400 kV transmission line from Indira Gandhi Super Thermal Power Station (IGSTPS) to Daulatabad constituted an   transmission system (ISTS) or an intra-state line.

Reaffirming its earlier findings, the CERC held that the line is an intra-state transmission line and therefore not subject to ISTS charges under the PoC (Point of Connection) mechanism.

This classification formed the legal basis for holding that the levy of interstate transmission charges on Haryana Discoms was not sustainable.

2. Refund Limited to Period Within Limitation

Following remand by APTEL, the CERC confined the relief to the legally permissible period from 03.06.2014 to 04.05.2018, in line with the application of limitation principles to adjudicatory proceedings.

The Tribunal had clarified that claims prior to June 2014 were time-barred, while claims within the three-year window were maintainable.

3. Quantification of Refund and Inclusion of April 2018

A key issue before the Commission was the computation of the refund amount.

• The parties reconciled a principal sum of ₹691.34 crore for June 2014 to March 2018
• The Petitioners claimed an additional amount for April 2018

Rejecting CTUIL’s objection, the CERC held that the Petitioners were entitled to refund for April 2018 as well, bringing the total principal refund to ₹711.44 crore.

The Commission specifically noted that billing for April 2018 continued to include LTA quantum attributable to Haryana’s share, thereby warranting refund.

4. Directions for Recovery and Adjustment Mechanism

The CERC permitted phased recovery of the refund amount by the Petitioners:

• ₹483.50 crore (already allowed earlier in instalments)
• ₹207.84 crore (balance recovery in further instalments)
• Additional ₹20.10 crore (pertaining to April 2018)

These recoveries are to be adjusted through charges collected under the applicable Sharing Regulations.

5. Entitlement to Interest and Restitution

In line with APTEL’s directions, the CERC recognised that the Petitioners are entitled to interest/carrying cost as a measure of restitution for amounts illegally recovered.

The Commission is required to determine:

• Whether interest should be simple or compound
• The applicable rate of interest
• The methodology of computation (including rests, if compound)

This stems from APTEL’s finding that recovery of ISTS charges on an intra-State line was unlawful, thereby triggering restitutionary principles.

6. Consumer Adjustment Through Tariff Mechanism

The Commission recorded that the Haryana Discoms had passed on these charges to consumers.

Accordingly, any refund (principal and interest) is required to be adjusted in future tariff determination, ensuring that the ultimate benefit flows to end consumers.

Judgement Link

APTEL rules on Section 79(1)(f) of the Electricity Act, 2003: No Automatic Reference to Arbitration in Composite PPA Disputes

In a landmark judgment dated 25.02.2026, the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (Appellate Tribunal) has ruled in favour of the Punjab State Power Corporation Limited (PSPCL) and the Haryana Discoms (UHBVNL and DHBVNL, through HPPC), setting aside the order passed by the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC).

The CERC, in its common order dated 19.11.2025, had directed that the disputes between the procurers and Tata Power Company Limited (TPCL) regarding the short-supply of contracted electricity be mandatorily resolved through arbitration. By allowing Appeal Nos. 371 and 400 of 2025 filed by the Haryana Utilities and PSPCL respectively, the Appellate Tribunal has reaffirmed the exclusive adjudicatory jurisdiction of the Regulatory Commissions over matters impacting public interest and tariff. 

1. Impermissibility of Splitting Causes of Action

One of the central issues in the appeals filed by PSPCL and HPPC was the CERC’s erroneous decision to bifurcate their petitions. Both utilities had sought compensation jointly and severally against TPCL and the Western Regional Load Despatch Centre (WRLDC), a statutory body. PSPCL and HPPC’s grievance was that while TPCL illegally ceased generating and supplying their contracted capacities (475 MW for PSPCL and 380 MW for HPPC), WRLDC failed in its statutory duty under Section 28 of the Electricity Act to ensure proportionate scheduling.

The CERC had attempted to refer the dispute against TPCL to arbitration, while leaving the procurers to file separate petitions against WRLDC.

Relying on the Supreme Court’s rulings in Sukanya Holdings and Vidya Drolia, the Appellate Tribunal held that Section 8 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 does not permit the bifurcation of a cause of action or the splitting of a suit between parties to an arbitration agreement (TPCL) and non-parties (WRLDC). Because WRLDC discharges statutory functions making disputes against it non-arbitrable, and since the monetary claims were joint and several against TPCL and WRLDC. 

2. Strict Compliance with Section 8 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996

The Appellate Tribunal also ruled on the procedural mandates of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (the “1996 Act”). The Appellate Tribunal held that the provisions of Section 8(1) of the 1996 Act apply strictly to proceedings before the CERC.

Under Section 8(1), a party seeking to invoke arbitration must apply not later than the date of submitting its first statement on the substance of the dispute. In the present batch of cases, TPCL completely failed to make such an application before filing its reply to the petitions instituted by PSPCL and HPPC. Furthermore, TPCL had even filed its own independent petition before the CERC. The Appellate Tribunal held that non-compliance with the mandatory timeline under Section 8(1) vitiated the CERC’s decision to refer the dispute to arbitration.

3. CERC cannot refer a dispute to Arbitration if it lacks Adjudicatory Jurisdiction

The CERC had held that because the disputes were “non-tariff” contractual breaches, it lacked the jurisdiction to adjudicate them, and was therefore “bound” to refer them to arbitration under the second limb of Section 79(1)(f) of the Electricity Act.

The Appellate Tribunal rejected the CERC’s view that it could refer disputes to arbitration merely because it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate them holding that the power to refer a dispute to arbitration is not independent of the power to adjudicate. Reaffirming the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in GUVNL v. Essar, APTEL noted that the word “and” in Section 79(1)(f) must be read as “or”. This grants the CERC the discretion to eitheradjudicate a dispute or refer it to arbitration.

The Appellate Tribunal established that the CERC can only refer those disputes to arbitration which it is legally empowered to adjudicate under clauses (a) to (d) of Section 79(1). If the CERC lacks inherent jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute, it simultaneously lacks the jurisdiction to refer that very dispute to arbitration.

4. Tariff and Regulatory Disputes are Non-Arbitrable

The Appellate Tribunal reiterated that the Electricity Act is a special enactment designed to protect public interest and consumers. Any dispute that concerns the regulatory functions of the Commission, or impacts the tariff of a generating company (either directly or indirectly), must be exclusively adjudicated by the Regulatory Commissions and cannot be relegated to a private Arbitral Tribunal.

By setting aside the CERC’s order dated 19.11.2025, the Appellate Tribunal has restored all petitions to CERC. The CERC is now directed to examine whether the subject matter of the disputes falls within the ambit of Section 79(1)(b) of the Electricity Act. If the disputes impact tariff or touch upon regulatory functions, the CERC is mandated to adjudicate them itself.

The judgment highlights the statutory limits on arbitral reference under Section 79(1)(f) of the Electricity Act, 2003 and clarifies the interface between the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and the Electricity Act, 2003, reinforcing the primacy of regulatory adjudication in statutory disputes.

Judgment Link

APTEL Reaffirms Statutory Primacy: Relinquishment Charges Upheld Despite Force Majeure

The dispute centred around the grant of Long-Term Access (‘LTA’) and the execution of a Bulk Power Transmission Agreement (‘BPTA’) between Aryan Renewable Energy Private Limited (‘Aryan Renewable’) and Central Transmission Utility (‘CTU’) for evacuation of power from Aryan Renewable’s proposed 1200 MW thermal power project at Amelia, Madhya Pradesh.

Background

Aryan Renewable proposed to set up a 1200 MW thermal power project in Madhya Pradesh and was granted LTA for the evacuation of power through the inter-State transmission system. Pursuant to the grant of LTA, a BPTA was executed, and the Appellant furnished a bank guarantee towards its transmission obligations.

Subsequently, the Central Water Commission declined to grant the No-Objection Certificate for water drawal, rendering the project non-implementable. Aryan Renewable contended that this constituted a force majeure event and that no unit of the generating station ever achieved commercial operation.

Thereafter, the bank guarantee submitted by Aryan Renewable were invoked, and the Central Electricity Regulation Commission (‘CERC’), vide the Impugned Order, held that Aryan Renewable remained liable to pay transmission and relinquishment charges under Regulation 18 of the Connectivity Regulations, 2009. Aggrieved, Aryan Renewable preferred an Appeal before the Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal.

Issues Framed by the Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal

1. Whether Regulation 18 of the Connectivity Regulations, 2009 applies to a “zero-day failure” case, where LTA was never availed due to Force Majeure?
2. Whether binding precedent by this Hon’ble Tribunal exists on the above
3. Whether independently of precedent, the text of Regulation 18 contains a casus omissus regarding zero-use scenarios due to force majeure events, which is governed exclusively by the BPTA
4. Whether Force Majeure under the BPTA overrides the statutory obligation to pay relinquishment charges under Regulation 18?

Analysis

Issue 1: Applicability of Regulation 18 to “zero-day failure” 

1(a): Whether binding precedent exists

Aryan Renewable’s case primarily rests on Brahmani Thermal Power Private Limited v. CERC & Ors. passed by the Appellate Tribunal [Judgement dated 20.03.2025], where Regulation 18 was interpreted as—

(i) it applies solely to voluntary relinquishment of LTA “out of its wish”, having “no application” to compulsory exits due to unforeseeable force majeure events beyond control; 

(ii) it presupposes actual stranded transmission capacity from such relinquishment, which is absent if lines are not commissioned or are utilised by others; and 

(iii) LTA granted to generators activates only post-commercial operation, so no transmission charges liability arises where force majeure prevents project establishment altogether.

Aryan Renewable also relied on PEL Power Ltd. v. CERC and Himachal Sorang Power Pvt. Ltd. v. CERC, arguing that these decisions collectively constitute binding precedent excluding ‘zero-use’ cases from the scope of Regulation 18. The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal rejected this submission. It noted that the judgments relied upon did not consider the full statutory framework of the Connectivity Regulations, 2009, particularly the interrelationship between Regulations 14, 15 and 18. The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal held that the Brahmanijudgment impermissibly read additional words into Regulation 18 by restricting its application to voluntary relinquishment alone, contrary to settled principles of statutory interpretation. The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal reiterated that a judgment is binding only for what it actually decides, and observations made without consideration of relevant statutory provisions do not qualify. 

1(b): Whether the text of Regulation 18 contains a casus omissus

Independently, Aryan Renewable contended that Regulation 18 uses the phrase “have availed access rights” in both its categories, implying the provision applies only where access has been operationalised, and that a zero-use case therefore, falls outside its scope as a casus omissus.

The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal rejected this contention. Through a harmonised reading of the definitions of ‘LTA’ and “long-term customer” under the Connectivity Regulations, 2009, the Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal held that the right to use the inter-State transmission system is conferred upon grant of LTA by the CTU, which is thereafter formalised through execution of the BPTA under Regulation 15. Regulation 14 was construed to distinguish between the grant of access and the date from which such access becomes operational.

The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal held that where access is relinquished after grant but before commissioning, the period of utilisation is necessarily zero years, which squarely falls within Regulation 18(1)(b), applicable to customers who have not availed access rights for at least twelve years. Consequently, the zero-day failure scenario is not an omitted case under the Regulations, and the plea of casus omissus was found to be without merit.

2. Whether Force Majeure under the BPTA overrides the statutory obligation to pay relinquishment charges under Regulation 18

Aryan Renewable argued that Clause of the BPTA dealing with force majeure operates as an overriding provision absolving it from all liabilities, including relinquishment charges. TheHon’ble Appellate Tribunal rejected this submission by emphasising the primacy of statutory regulations over contractual arrangements.

The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal relied on the Constitution Bench decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in PTC India Ltd. v. CERC to reiterate that regulations framed under Section 178 of the Electricity Act, 2003, have the force of subordinate legislation and override contractual provisions.

The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal further held that Clause of the BPTA merely exempts parties from claims for loss or damage arising from force majeure and does not extend to statutory transmission or relinquishment charges, which form part of a pooled, non-discriminatory transmission framework. Transmission charges are not payable to CTU alone but are shared among Designated ISTS Customers under the Sharing Regulations, and therefore cannot be characterised as contractual damages.

In the absence of a force majeure exception in Regulation 18 itself, and given the statutory treatment of the Connectivity Regulations, the Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal concluded that Clauses of the BPTA cannot override the obligation to pay relinquishment charges under Regulation 18(1)(b). The appeal was therefore, dismissed as being devoid of merit.

Conclusion

The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal judgment placed an emphasis on the statutory nature of the Connectivity Regulations 2009, making it clear that they were not to be superseded by the BPTA, and that there was no cassus omissus in Regulation 18 underlining the importance of construing the same in a harmonious matter.

Judgment Link

Sanctity Of The Bidding Documents And The Tariff Incorporated In The Ppa In Cases Where Accelerated Depreciation Has Been Availed By The Generator

The dispute revolves around the nature of depreciation availed by Mokia Green Energy Pvt. Ltd. (“Appellant”) and its consequent impact on tariff charged as per the Power Purchase Agreement (“PPA”) which was executed following a Request for Proposal (“RfP”) and Competitive Bidding Process. The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal vide its Judgement dated 08.01.2026 in Appeal 323 of 2025 has dismissed the appeal filed by the Appellant and held that tariff has to necessarily be reduced on availment of Accelerated Depreciation. 

Background

In 2013, a RfP was issued by Punjab Electricity Development Agency (“PEDA”) where it was stipulated that if at any stage it is found that project availing normal rate of depreciation is claiming Accelerated Depreciation, then tariff would be revised as per the Punjab State Electricity Regulation Commission (“PSERC”) tariff applicable for Accelerated Depreciation, with effect from the date of commissioning.

The Appellant was one of the successful bidders and had declared that it will avail for normal rate of depreciation. Consequently, the Appellant and Punjab State Power Corporation Ltd. (“PSPCL”) entered into a PPA. However, later it was discovered that the Appellant was availing Accelerated Depreciation and, consequently PSPCL issued a notice of demand for reducing the applicable tariff. The Appellant had furnished a specific undertaking before signing the PPA that the Appellant will not avail Accelerated Depreciation.

Issues Framed by the Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal

1. Whether the rate of depreciation, i.e. 80% claimed by the Appellant constitutes as Accelerated Depreciation?
2. Assuming the Appellant had claimed accelerated depreciation, whether PSPCL can revise the tariff in the absence of a specific provision in the PPA? 
3. Whether PSPCL can direct the Appellant to pass on or refund any amount in the absence of any financial benefit having accrued to it?

Analysis

Issue 1: Accelerated Depreciation

The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal examined the scheme of Section 32 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (“IT Act”) and noted that it provides two alternative depreciation regimes. Depreciation under Section 32(1)(i), read with Appendix IA and Rule 5(1A) of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 (“IT Rules”), applies the straight-line method and prescribes a rate of 7.69% for solar power generating systems. In contrast, depreciation under Section 32(1)(ii), read with Appendix I and Rule 5(1) of the IT Rules, follows the written down value method and permits a substantially higher rate of depreciation of 80%/40%.

The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal held that the depreciation regime yielding higher depreciation in the initial years necessarily constitutes “accelerated depreciation”, and the absence of the express term in Section 32(1)(ii) does not alter its substantive character. Since the Appellant admittedly claimed depreciation under Section 32(1)(ii) at the rate of 80%/40%, it was rightly held to have availed accelerated depreciation.

Issue 2: Entire Agreement Clause in the PPA

In so far as arguments of the Appellant concerning “entire agreement” clause in the PPA, theHon’ble Appellate Tribunal emphasised that tariff is not a standalone numerical figure and cannot be read in isolation. It is inextricably linked to the competitive bidding process conducted pursuant to the RfP, and is therefore inherently subject to the terms and conditions stipulated therein.

The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal noted that the Preamble to the PPA expressly recognises the Implementation Agreement (“IA”), which unequivocally binds the Company to act in accordance with the terms of the RfP. In light of this contractual framework, it was held that the IA forms an inseparable part of the PPA, thereby binding the Appellant to the conditions of the RfP notwithstanding the presence of an “entire agreement” clause.

The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal further rejected the Appellant’s contention that the Undertaking, whereby it committed to avail only normal depreciation, ought to be read down in the event of inconsistency with the PPA. It was held that such an undertaking cannot be rendered redundant merely because the consequences of its breach were not expressly restated in the PPA. In the event of such a lacuna, the consequences must necessarily be imported from the bidding documents, which constitute the foundation of the contractual relationship.

Issue 3: Benefit Accrued on account of Accelerated Depreciation

The Appellant contended that even if it were held to have availed accelerated depreciation, no benefit was required to be passed on since it was a loss-making entity and had derived no actual financial gain. This contention was rejected on the ground that the accrual of benefit was immaterial. The RfP and the tariff determined by PSERC expressly provided for differential tariffs depending on whether accelerated depreciation was availed, irrespective of the generator’s profitability. Consequently, the tariff was required to be revised in accordance with the RfP, and the question of whether the Appellant had actually benefited from accelerated depreciation was held to be irrelevant.

Conclusion

The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal’s judgment underscores that generators are bound by their undertakings. It further reiterates the need for harmonious construction of contractual documents and affirms that tariff revision will follow in case the generators resile on their commitment to avail normal depreciation, independent of any actual benefit accrued by the generator.

Judgement Link

Hon’ble Supreme Court Upholds APTEL’s Restitution Findings In The Vemagiri Transmission Dispute; Dismisses REC’s Challenge

Introduction

On 10.10.2025, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India dismissed Civil Appeal Nos. 11011–11013 of 2025 filed by REC Power Development and Consultancy Limited (REC), thereby affirming the judgment dated 27.05.2025 passed by the Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (APTEL).

The appeals concerned long-standing disputes surrounding the Vemagiri Transmission Project, developed under the Tariff-Based Competitive Bidding (TBCB) framework in terms of the Guidelines dated 17.04.2006. Central to the matter were issues of restitution, regulatory jurisdiction, and the extent to which a Bid Process Coordinator (BPC) could be held accountable for actions taken during the execution of the TBCB process.

R Associates represented Power Grid Corporation of India Limited (POWERGRID), the successful bidder for the transmission project, whose acquisition costs and subsequent expenses were under challenge.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court, affirming APTEL’s reasoning, declined to interfere with the detailed factual and legal findings, recognising that principles of fairness and restitution governed the dispute.

Background

The Vemagiri Transmission Project was initiated to evacuate power from the gas-based generation projects of Spectrum and Samalkot under a TBCB framework.

In 2012, REC, acting as BPC, insisted that POWERGRID proceed with acquisition of the Special Purpose Vehicle—Vemagiri Transmission System Limited (VTSL), despite the Ministry of Power’s notifications dated 14.03.2012 and 19.03.2012 indicating non-availability of domestic gas for the concerned generators.

Spectrum and Samalkot themselves had, in letters dated 30.03.2012 and 06.04.2012, sought cancellation or deferment of the Transmission Service Agreement (TSA). REC nevertheless required POWERGRID to acquire VTSL and pay the acquisition price of Rs. 18.27 crores.

Given this sequence, POWERGRID later sought restitution before the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC), leading to a series of proceedings culminating in APTEL’s judgment directing adjustment of costs and holding REC accountable for failing to defer acquisition despite clear grounds to do so.

APTEL held that:

1. Spectrum and Samalkot were not liable for acquisition or operational costs;
2. POWERGRID could not be saddled with costs it incurred under compelling circumstances;
3. CERC must adjust these costs either by recovering the amount from REC or through other regulatory mechanisms.

REC challenged these findings before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

Submission Made by the Parties

REC contended as under:

• CERC lacked jurisdiction over disputes involving BPC, as REC was only a pro forma party to the original proceedings.
• The acquisition was undertaken voluntarily by POWERGRID, despite indications regarding gas non-availability, and therefore no restitution could be claimed.
• APTEL erred in fastening liability upon REC when it was not a party to the TSA and had no role after initiating the bidding process.

POWERGRID’s key submissions were as under:

• REC, as BPC, failed in its statutory role:
  Under Clause 2.4(e) of the Request for Proposal (RfP), REC had the express power to defer acquisition on account of material developments. Despite receiving letters from Spectrum and Ministry notifications regarding non-availability of gas, REC insisted on strict adherence to timelines and mandated payment of acquisition price.
• POWERGRID acted without fault and under compelling circumstances:
  POWERGRID highlighted that non-compliance would have resulted in encashment of its bid bond under Clause 2.7 of the RfP. As the selected bidder, POWERGRID had no discretion other than to fulfil bid terms.
  
• Certain Concurrent findings of CERC and APTEL:
  Both authorities concurrently upheld that the acquisition price to be paid to POWERGRID is required to be reimbursed.
  
• CERC had jurisdiction over disputes involving a transmission licensee and BPC:
  Relying on Section 79(1)(c) and (f) of the Act, POWERGRID submitted that disputes “in connection with” inter-State transmission, including those arising during bidding, acquisition, and TSA implementation, fall squarely within the Central Commission’s jurisdiction. Reference was also made to the wide interpretation of regulatory powers recognised in K. Ramanathan v. State of Tamil Nadu and Energy Watchdog v. CERC.
• Restitution was the only equitable outcome:
  POWERGRID urged that the economic position preceding compelled acquisition must be restored, especially when the project could not proceed due to reasons clearly beyond its control.

Analysis and Conclusion

The Hon’ble Supreme Court, after hearing all parties, declined to interfere with APTEL’s detailed factual findings and legal reasoning, observing that “…no grounds are made out to interfere with the impugned judgment/order passed by the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity, New Delhi, on principles of fairness as well as restitution.”

The Hon’ble Supreme Court has thereby affirmed:

• the correctness of APTEL’s restitution-based approach;
• the concurrent findings of CERC and APTEL that the concurrently upheld that the acquisition price to be paid to POWERGRID is required to be reimbursed.
• the power of CERC to adjudicate disputes involving BPCs when connected to inter-State transmission; and
• the accountability of the Bid Process Coordinator when its actions materially contribute to avoidable economic loss.
• By dismissing REC’s appeals, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has brought finality to more than a decade of litigation stemming from the aborted Vemagiri Transmission System. The decision reinforces jurisprudence on BPC obligations, regulatory oversight under Section 79, and the availability of restitutionary remedies within the TBCB framework.

Prepared By:
Reeha Singh

Represented by:
Shubham Arya, Poorva Saigal, Reeha Singh and Shirin Gupta

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CERC Upholds Revocation of Connectivity for 300 MW Wind Project; Denies Relief to Inox Green in Bhuj-II Transmission Dispute

In an order dated 17.11.2025, the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) has declined relief to Inox Green Energy Services Limited (IGESL) concerning its 300 MW connectivity at Bhuj-II Pooling Station, while upholding the regulatory framework governing connectivity and General Network Access (GNA).

The decision provides important clarity on compliance obligations under the GNA Regulations and the treatment of connectivity in cases of project delays.

1. Connectivity Linked to SECI-awarded Wind Projects

The matter pertains to IGESL’s 300 MW wind power project in Kutch, Gujarat, developed pursuant to six Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) executed with Solar Energy Corporation of India (SECI).

While SECI granted multiple extensions of the Scheduled Commissioning Date (SCOD) up to 31.08.2022, the project remained uncommissioned beyond the extended timelines.

2. Regulatory Compliance Under GNA Framework

The Commission examined compliance requirements under the Connectivity and GNA Regulations, including:

• Achievement of Commercial Operation Date (COD)
• Demonstration of financial closure
• Adherence to prescribed timelines for connectivity utilisation

The record indicated that these milestones had not been fulfilled within the applicable regulatory timelines.

3. Connectivity and GNA: Regulatory Consequences of Non-Compliance

Pursuant to the applicable regulatory framework, steps were taken in relation to the connectivity granted to the Petitioner, including:

• Issuance of notices seeking compliance with regulatory requirements
• Invocation of applicable provisions under the GNA Regulations
• Action in respect of connectivity and associated bank guarantees

The Commission observed that such measures were taken in accordance with the governing regulations and applicable procedures.

4. Consideration of Project Delays

The Petitioner attributed delays to factors such as:

• Land allocation challenges in Gujarat
• Delay in readiness of evacuation infrastructure
• Pandemic-related disruptions
• Financing constraints

While these factors were noted, the Commission emphasised that connectivity under the regulatory framework remains contingent upon timely compliance with prescribed milestones.

5. No Automatic Right to Retain or Reallocate Connectivity

The Petitioner sought retention of connectivity under alternative routes and requested that the 300 MW capacity be reserved in its favour.

The Commission declined these prayers, holding that:

• Connectivity is conditional and not absolute in nature
• Continued non-utilisation of allocated capacity cannot be sustained indefinitely
• Allocation of transmission capacity must align with regulatory discipline and system efficiency

6. Delineation of Issues Beyond Scope

The Commission clarified that certain issues including

• Extension of SCOD
• Liquidated damages under PPAs

are being examined in separate proceedings and were not adjudicated in the present matter.

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Supreme Court rules in favour of the Powergrid Corporation of India Limited reinforcing regulatory role of the Central Commission Under Electricity Act, 2003

The Supreme Court today (May 15) ruled that the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) is not precluded from exercising its functions under Section 79 of the Electricity Act, 2003  in the absence of regulations framed under Section 178 of the Electricity Act, 2003. 

The Judgment arises out of the SLPs filed by Powergrid Corporation of India Limited (PGCIL) against the Order dated 25.02.2021 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh admitting the writ petitions filed by the Madhya Pradesh Power Transmission Company Limited (MPPTCL). 

MPPTCL had filed the Writ Petition before the High Court on the ground that the CERC had exercised powers  beyond its jurisdiction as per the regulations notified under Section 178 of the Electricity Act, 2003 while passing the orders dated 21.01.2020 and 27.01.2020 in Petition No. 311/TT/2018 and Petition No. 266/TT/2018 filed by PGCIL seeking transmission tariff for its assets.   

While setting aside the judgment dated 25.02.2021 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, the Supreme Court answered the following questions in favour of PGCIL:

i. Whether the CERC, while exercising its functions under Section 79(1) of   the Act, 2003, is circumscribed by statutory regulations enacted under   Section 178 of the Act, 2003?  

ii. Whether the CERC exercises regulatory or adjudicatory functions under   Section 79 of the Act, 2003? In other words, what is the scope of the CERC’s power to regulate inter-state transmission of electricity and determine tariff for the same under clauses (c) and (d) of Section 79(1)?

iii. Whether the grant of compensation by the CERC for the delay vide the orders dated 21.01.2020 and 27.01.2020 respectively, is a regulatory or adjudicatory function and to what extent are the principles of natural justice applicable to the exercise of such functions? 

iv. Whether the High Court was justified in admitting the writ petition filed by the respondent no. 1 herein challenging the order dated 21.01.2020 of the CERC when there existed an alternative remedy under Section 111 of   the Act, 2003?  

While dealing with the above questions, the Supreme Court has held as under:

a. CERC functions as both – decision-making and regulation-making authority under Section 79 and 178 of the Act, 2003 respectively.

b. While noting the Constitution Bench judgment in PTC India Limited v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (2010) 4 SCC 603, the Supreme Court has held that the Regulations under Section 178 has the effect of interfering with and overriding contractual relationships between the regulated entities, however, on the other hand the orders under Section 79 have to be confined to the existing statutory regulations and do not have the effect of altering the terms of contract between the specific parties before the CERC

c. In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in PTC and Energy Watchdog v. CERC reported in (2017) 14 SCC 80, it has been held that the absence of a regulation under Section 178 does not preclude the CERC from exercising its powers under Section 79(1) to make specific regulations or pass orders between the parties before it.

d. In the present case, the Supreme Court held that there is no contractual clause between the parties for establishing the risks of delay in commissioning of a transmission asset. There is also no uniform settled position as regards the liability of transmission charges payable before a particular transmission element is put in operation, in the form of regulations under Section 178. These circumstances, considered together with the prohibition on imposing liability of delayed payments on beneficiaries, leave a regulatory gap. The Supreme Court then proceeded to hold that in light of the dictum in the case of Energy Watchdog case, in the situation of an absence in Regulation, Guidelines or Contractual clauses, the Act, 2003 mandates that the CERC may strike a judicious balance keeping in mind commercial principles and consumers interest in exercise of its general regulatory powers under Section 79.

e. The Supreme Court further held that sources of power for enactment of a regulation under Section 178 and regulatory order under Section 79(1) are different. The   former emanates from the power of delegated legislation whereas the latter is an ad hoc power which is limited to the specific parties and situation in context of which the order is given. Since the regulatory powers under Section 79(1)  are of an ad hoc nature and are not of general application, the orders thereunder  are made appealable under Section 111.   

In light of the above findings, the Supreme Court held that CERC is empowered to order for imposition of transmission charges on the party to whom delay is attributable and there was no occasion for High Court to admit the Writ Petitions and CERC . The Supreme Court has concluded that APTEL is the appropriate authority to look into the merits of the matter should MPPTCL choose to prefer an appeal before APTEL under Section 111 of the Act, 2003.

The copy of the judgment has been directed to be circulated to all High Courts.  

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