APTEL Reaffirms Statutory Primacy: Relinquishment Charges Upheld Despite Force Majeure

The dispute centred around the grant of Long-Term Access (‘LTA’) and the execution of a Bulk Power Transmission Agreement (‘BPTA’) between Aryan Renewable Energy Private Limited (‘Aryan Renewable’) and Central Transmission Utility (‘CTU’) for evacuation of power from Aryan Renewable’s proposed 1200 MW thermal power project at Amelia, Madhya Pradesh.

Background

Aryan Renewable proposed to set up a 1200 MW thermal power project in Madhya Pradesh and was granted LTA for the evacuation of power through the inter-State transmission system. Pursuant to the grant of LTA, a BPTA was executed, and the Appellant furnished a bank guarantee towards its transmission obligations.

Subsequently, the Central Water Commission declined to grant the No-Objection Certificate for water drawal, rendering the project non-implementable. Aryan Renewable contended that this constituted a force majeure event and that no unit of the generating station ever achieved commercial operation.

Thereafter, the bank guarantee submitted by Aryan Renewable were invoked, and the Central Electricity Regulation Commission (‘CERC’), vide the Impugned Order, held that Aryan Renewable remained liable to pay transmission and relinquishment charges under Regulation 18 of the Connectivity Regulations, 2009. Aggrieved, Aryan Renewable preferred an Appeal before the Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal.

Issues Framed by the Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal

1. Whether Regulation 18 of the Connectivity Regulations, 2009 applies to a “zero-day failure” case, where LTA was never availed due to Force Majeure?
2. Whether binding precedent by this Hon’ble Tribunal exists on the above
3. Whether independently of precedent, the text of Regulation 18 contains a casus omissus regarding zero-use scenarios due to force majeure events, which is governed exclusively by the BPTA
4. Whether Force Majeure under the BPTA overrides the statutory obligation to pay relinquishment charges under Regulation 18?

Analysis

Issue 1: Applicability of Regulation 18 to “zero-day failure” 

1(a): Whether binding precedent exists

Aryan Renewable’s case primarily rests on Brahmani Thermal Power Private Limited v. CERC & Ors. passed by the Appellate Tribunal [Judgement dated 20.03.2025], where Regulation 18 was interpreted as—

(i) it applies solely to voluntary relinquishment of LTA “out of its wish”, having “no application” to compulsory exits due to unforeseeable force majeure events beyond control; 

(ii) it presupposes actual stranded transmission capacity from such relinquishment, which is absent if lines are not commissioned or are utilised by others; and 

(iii) LTA granted to generators activates only post-commercial operation, so no transmission charges liability arises where force majeure prevents project establishment altogether.

Aryan Renewable also relied on PEL Power Ltd. v. CERC and Himachal Sorang Power Pvt. Ltd. v. CERC, arguing that these decisions collectively constitute binding precedent excluding ‘zero-use’ cases from the scope of Regulation 18. The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal rejected this submission. It noted that the judgments relied upon did not consider the full statutory framework of the Connectivity Regulations, 2009, particularly the interrelationship between Regulations 14, 15 and 18. The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal held that the Brahmanijudgment impermissibly read additional words into Regulation 18 by restricting its application to voluntary relinquishment alone, contrary to settled principles of statutory interpretation. The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal reiterated that a judgment is binding only for what it actually decides, and observations made without consideration of relevant statutory provisions do not qualify. 

1(b): Whether the text of Regulation 18 contains a casus omissus

Independently, Aryan Renewable contended that Regulation 18 uses the phrase “have availed access rights” in both its categories, implying the provision applies only where access has been operationalised, and that a zero-use case therefore, falls outside its scope as a casus omissus.

The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal rejected this contention. Through a harmonised reading of the definitions of ‘LTA’ and “long-term customer” under the Connectivity Regulations, 2009, the Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal held that the right to use the inter-State transmission system is conferred upon grant of LTA by the CTU, which is thereafter formalised through execution of the BPTA under Regulation 15. Regulation 14 was construed to distinguish between the grant of access and the date from which such access becomes operational.

The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal held that where access is relinquished after grant but before commissioning, the period of utilisation is necessarily zero years, which squarely falls within Regulation 18(1)(b), applicable to customers who have not availed access rights for at least twelve years. Consequently, the zero-day failure scenario is not an omitted case under the Regulations, and the plea of casus omissus was found to be without merit.

2. Whether Force Majeure under the BPTA overrides the statutory obligation to pay relinquishment charges under Regulation 18

Aryan Renewable argued that Clause of the BPTA dealing with force majeure operates as an overriding provision absolving it from all liabilities, including relinquishment charges. TheHon’ble Appellate Tribunal rejected this submission by emphasising the primacy of statutory regulations over contractual arrangements.

The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal relied on the Constitution Bench decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in PTC India Ltd. v. CERC to reiterate that regulations framed under Section 178 of the Electricity Act, 2003, have the force of subordinate legislation and override contractual provisions.

The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal further held that Clause of the BPTA merely exempts parties from claims for loss or damage arising from force majeure and does not extend to statutory transmission or relinquishment charges, which form part of a pooled, non-discriminatory transmission framework. Transmission charges are not payable to CTU alone but are shared among Designated ISTS Customers under the Sharing Regulations, and therefore cannot be characterised as contractual damages.

In the absence of a force majeure exception in Regulation 18 itself, and given the statutory treatment of the Connectivity Regulations, the Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal concluded that Clauses of the BPTA cannot override the obligation to pay relinquishment charges under Regulation 18(1)(b). The appeal was therefore, dismissed as being devoid of merit.

Conclusion

The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal judgment placed an emphasis on the statutory nature of the Connectivity Regulations 2009, making it clear that they were not to be superseded by the BPTA, and that there was no cassus omissus in Regulation 18 underlining the importance of construing the same in a harmonious matter.

Judgment Link

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APTEL Tightens the Screws on Public Interest Litigation: Strict Locus Standi Now Mandatory in Electricity Matters

I. Introduction

The Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (“APTEL”) reaffirmed in its April 8, 2025 judgment that public interest organizations must comply with stringent statutory locus standi criteria under the Electricity Act, 2003 (“Act”) when challenging regulatory orders. Mere altruistic intent does not equate to legal standing.

This analysis assesses APTEL’s ruling—its legal reasoning, statutory underpinnings, and broader implications for public-interest litigation in the power sector.

II. Statutory & Regulatory Framework

1. Section 2(15) defines “consumer” as any person supplied electricity for his own use.
   
2. Section 111 permits appeals before APTEL by “any person aggrieved” by orders of Appropriate Commissions.
   
3. The CERC/State ERC Conduct of Business Regulations often allow consumer representation but require formal legal standing, not just goodwill.
   

Section 111’s qualifier—“aggrieved”—imposes both legal injury and direct effect requirements.

III. Facts: Review by Surat Citizens Council Trust

• APTEL had earlier dismissed Appeal No 341 of 2017, where the Surat Citizens Council Trust challenged tariff orders by GERC, alleging broad public harm.
  
• The Trust was not a direct consumer and lacked mandates in its object clause to represent tariff payers.
  
• The Trust periodically obtained RTI information and audit data, but did not hold consumer status.
  

It approached APTEL via a review petition, invoking public interest and systemic grievances—a plea the Tribunal firmly rejected.

IV. APTEL’s Legal Findings

1. Strict Statutory Standing: Under Section 2(15), absence of consumer status meant the Trust was not “aggrieved” under Section 111.
   
2. No Representative Authority: Its governing documents included no mandate to represent affected consumers.
   
3. No Direct Injury: Lacked evidence showing tariff harm, either personal or through members.
   
4. Public Interest Alone Insufficient: Motivations, however noble, cannot replace statutory prerequisites.
   
5. Inadmissible Review Relief: Review petitions cannot re-litigate merits beyond correcting “error apparent on face.” The Trust’s new submissions were too late and not ground for review.

V. Judicial Reasoning: Public Interest vs. Legal Standing

APTEL drew a clear distinction between:

• Abstract or derivative harm, which is inadmissible; and
  
• Concrete, direct legal injury, which satisfies locus standi.
  

The Tribunal cited precedent from both electricity law and general administrative law to clarify that mere public spiritedness cannot override statutory architecture. In particular, it relied on the legal position in:

• Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, (1976) 1 SCC 671 – wherein the Supreme Court rejected “busybody” litigants lacking direct grievance.
  
• PTC India Ltd. v. CERC, (2010) 4 SCC 603 – which defined the scope of regulatory jurisdiction and clarified statutory appellate paths under the Electricity Act.
  

The ruling squarely rejected the notion that public interest is a standalone ground for approaching APTEL without complying with the substantive requirements of the Act.

VI. Procedural Takeaways

The Tribunal provided guidance for public interest groups wishing to approach electricity tribunals:

1. Object Clause Alignment: The organization’s charter must show a clear mandate to represent electricity consumers or affected stakeholders.
   
2. Proof of Injury or Representation: Entities must demonstrate:
   • A direct relationship to the impugned order; or
     
   • Authorization from identified consumer groups.
3. Participatory Prerequisite: Participation in the original regulatory proceedings before the SERC or CERC is essential. Post-facto intervention is rarely permitted.
   
4. No Collateral Appeals: Entities cannot repackage generalized grievances to reopen decisions already adjudicated.
   

This procedural discipline preserves the limited judicial bandwidth of APTEL for truly aggrieved persons, ensuring that regulatory stability is not undermined by unvetted interventions.

VII. Policy Context: Rise in NGO and Trust Interventions

In recent years, several NGOs, citizen forums, and local trusts have begun using the Electricity Act’s appeal provisions to challenge tariff orders, PPAs, and procurement guidelines—often citing environmental or public affordability concerns.

While such interventions can add valuable perspective, APTEL’s ruling underscores that such efforts must be institutionally disciplined. Courts and tribunals cannot act as policy forums or oversight bodies unless approached by legally competent persons or groups.

VIII. Impact on Public Interest Litigation in the Power Sector

The APTEL judgment will likely curb indiscriminate filing of appeals and reviews by public interest organizations that do not meet the minimum statutory thresholds. Key implications include:

a) Enhanced Gatekeeping

Electricity sector regulators and tribunals will adopt a stricter filter while examining the maintainability of petitions filed in the name of public interest. This ensures judicial economy, reduces backlog, and preserves the integrity of sectoral adjudication.

b) Higher Compliance Burden on NGOs

Organizations seeking to represent consumer interests in tariff matters must now align their incorporation documents, obtain mandates from affected groups, and demonstrate direct or representative standing. Casual or peripheral involvement will no longer suffice.

c) Clarity on Review Jurisdiction

The judgment also clarifies the limited scope of review under APTEL’s procedural rules. Review petitions are not a substitute for appeal, and any attempt to reopen findings without pointing to an evident error or omission will be summarily dismissed.

d) Sectoral Certainty

The ruling stabilizes regulatory processes in the electricity sector by preventing ad hoc disruption of commission decisions via loosely framed PIL-type reviews. This is especially important in tariff fixation and grid planning, where long-term investments depend on regulatory predictability.

IX. Comparative Jurisprudence

The Tribunal’s approach aligns with the principles upheld in:

• Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary, (1992) 4 SCC 305 – holding that “public interest litigation is not a license for irresponsible litigation”.
  
• Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of West Bengal, (2004) 3 SCC 349 – where the Supreme Court cautioned against abuse of PIL to serve personal or political ends.
  

The power sector’s regulatory adjudication thus continues to follow the broader judicial movement toward structured, merit-based public litigation, discouraging speculative or ideologically motivated filings.

Conclusion

The April 2025 decision of APTEL in the Surat Citizens Council Trust matter marks a pivotal clarification in the domain of regulatory litigation. While it does not exclude public interest entities altogether, it mandates rigorous compliance with statutory locus standi.

This ruling preserves the integrity of the appellate framework under the Electricity Act, 2003 by ensuring that only persons with direct legal grievance or properly authorized representation may invoke appellate jurisdiction. In doing so, APTEL has drawn a necessary and constitutionally valid line between participatory governance and judicial intervention.

Going forward, electricity regulatory litigation in India will need to reflect structured advocacy, institutional mandate, and demonstrable harm—lest it be struck down at the threshold.

APTEL – Surat Citizens Council Trust (Review Petition No. 1 of 2025 in Appeal No. 341 of 2017) – https://aptel.gov.in/sites/default/files/2025-04/RP%201%20of%202025%20.pdf?

Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed & Ors. (1975) – https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1749406/

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Supreme Court rules in favour of the Powergrid Corporation of India Limited reinforcing regulatory role of the Central Commission Under Electricity Act, 2003

The Supreme Court today (May 15) ruled that the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) is not precluded from exercising its functions under Section 79 of the Electricity Act, 2003  in the absence of regulations framed under Section 178 of the Electricity Act, 2003. 

The Judgment arises out of the SLPs filed by Powergrid Corporation of India Limited (PGCIL) against the Order dated 25.02.2021 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh admitting the writ petitions filed by the Madhya Pradesh Power Transmission Company Limited (MPPTCL). 

MPPTCL had filed the Writ Petition before the High Court on the ground that the CERC had exercised powers  beyond its jurisdiction as per the regulations notified under Section 178 of the Electricity Act, 2003 while passing the orders dated 21.01.2020 and 27.01.2020 in Petition No. 311/TT/2018 and Petition No. 266/TT/2018 filed by PGCIL seeking transmission tariff for its assets.   

While setting aside the judgment dated 25.02.2021 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, the Supreme Court answered the following questions in favour of PGCIL:

i. Whether the CERC, while exercising its functions under Section 79(1) of   the Act, 2003, is circumscribed by statutory regulations enacted under   Section 178 of the Act, 2003?  

ii. Whether the CERC exercises regulatory or adjudicatory functions under   Section 79 of the Act, 2003? In other words, what is the scope of the CERC’s power to regulate inter-state transmission of electricity and determine tariff for the same under clauses (c) and (d) of Section 79(1)?

iii. Whether the grant of compensation by the CERC for the delay vide the orders dated 21.01.2020 and 27.01.2020 respectively, is a regulatory or adjudicatory function and to what extent are the principles of natural justice applicable to the exercise of such functions? 

iv. Whether the High Court was justified in admitting the writ petition filed by the respondent no. 1 herein challenging the order dated 21.01.2020 of the CERC when there existed an alternative remedy under Section 111 of   the Act, 2003?  

While dealing with the above questions, the Supreme Court has held as under:

a. CERC functions as both – decision-making and regulation-making authority under Section 79 and 178 of the Act, 2003 respectively.

b. While noting the Constitution Bench judgment in PTC India Limited v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (2010) 4 SCC 603, the Supreme Court has held that the Regulations under Section 178 has the effect of interfering with and overriding contractual relationships between the regulated entities, however, on the other hand the orders under Section 79 have to be confined to the existing statutory regulations and do not have the effect of altering the terms of contract between the specific parties before the CERC

c. In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in PTC and Energy Watchdog v. CERC reported in (2017) 14 SCC 80, it has been held that the absence of a regulation under Section 178 does not preclude the CERC from exercising its powers under Section 79(1) to make specific regulations or pass orders between the parties before it.

d. In the present case, the Supreme Court held that there is no contractual clause between the parties for establishing the risks of delay in commissioning of a transmission asset. There is also no uniform settled position as regards the liability of transmission charges payable before a particular transmission element is put in operation, in the form of regulations under Section 178. These circumstances, considered together with the prohibition on imposing liability of delayed payments on beneficiaries, leave a regulatory gap. The Supreme Court then proceeded to hold that in light of the dictum in the case of Energy Watchdog case, in the situation of an absence in Regulation, Guidelines or Contractual clauses, the Act, 2003 mandates that the CERC may strike a judicious balance keeping in mind commercial principles and consumers interest in exercise of its general regulatory powers under Section 79.

e. The Supreme Court further held that sources of power for enactment of a regulation under Section 178 and regulatory order under Section 79(1) are different. The   former emanates from the power of delegated legislation whereas the latter is an ad hoc power which is limited to the specific parties and situation in context of which the order is given. Since the regulatory powers under Section 79(1)  are of an ad hoc nature and are not of general application, the orders thereunder  are made appealable under Section 111.   

In light of the above findings, the Supreme Court held that CERC is empowered to order for imposition of transmission charges on the party to whom delay is attributable and there was no occasion for High Court to admit the Writ Petitions and CERC . The Supreme Court has concluded that APTEL is the appropriate authority to look into the merits of the matter should MPPTCL choose to prefer an appeal before APTEL under Section 111 of the Act, 2003.

The copy of the judgment has been directed to be circulated to all High Courts.  

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Supreme Court Upholds State Regulatory Oversight Over Inter-State Power Procurement Affecting Local Grid

The Supreme Court affirms that State Commissions can regulate inter-state electricity procurement affecting local grids. A landmark interpretation under the Electricity Act, 2003.

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