APTEL Clarifies but Does Not Reopen, The Arbitrability Question Under Section 79(1)(f): Review Petition No. 6 of 2026

Tata Power Company Limited v. Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited & Ors., Review Petition No. 6 of 2026 decided on 17 September 2026 

The Dispute

Tata Power sought review of Appellate Tribunal’s common judgment dated 25 February 2026 in Appeal Nos. 348 of 2025 & Batch. Tata Power contended that the judgment under review had described paragraph 36 of the Appellate Tribunal’s earlier judgment dated 28 August 2024 in Appeal No. 309 of 2019 (the DVC judgment) as a “stray sentence” and that conclusion of the judgment under review that only disputes falling within clauses (a) to (d) of Section 79(1) can be adjudicated by the Central Commission or referred to arbitration under Section 79(1)(f) was directly contrary to the DVC judgment of a coordinate bench, which the Judgement under Review could not dilute.

Paragraph 36 of the DVC judgment had recorded that non-tariff disputes involving a generating company or a distribution licensee do not fall within clause (f) of Section 79(1) and are thus arbitrable. The challenge to DVC judgment was dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 10480 of 2024.

The Law on Review

The Appellate Tribunal restated the settled position under Section 114 and Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC: an error apparent on the face of the record is one that is self-evident and not one established by a long-drawn process of reasoning, review corrects a patent mistake but does not substitute a view and a review petition cannot become an appeal in disguise.

Findings on the Substantive Ground

The Appellate Tribunal declined to disturb the reasoning of the judgment under review. The Appellate Tribunal held that since the Central Commission can adjudicate only disputes falling under clauses (a) to (d) of Section 79(1), its referral power is confined to the same category. The identically worded second limb of Section 86(1)(f) was read in the same manner, the Appellate Tribunal noting that a contrary construction would create concurrent referral jurisdiction between the Central and State Commissions and would permit a State Commission to refer disputes falling wholly outside its State.

On Renew Wind Energy (AP2) (P) Ltd. v. Solar Energy Corporation of India, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 8252, the Appellate Tribunal held that the Hon’ble High Court’s attention had not been drawn to Hindustan Zinc Ltd. v. Ajmer Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd., (2019) 17 SCC 82 and that the Appellate Tribunal was bound to follow the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

The Appellate Tribunal held that the judgment under review does not contradict the DVC judgment but is clarificatory of it, explaining its actual purport and observed that the clarification “ought to have been given in the DVC judgment itself”.

The Appellate Tribunal recorded its disapproval at paragraph 36 of the DVC judgment being characterised as a “stray sentence”, holding that the paragraph contained the final view of the Appellate Tribunal on arbitrability and that without it the DVC judgment would be inchoate. That characterisation was held to be an error apparent on the face of the record and those observations alone were set aside. The review petition was thereafter dismissed.

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Karnataka High Court upholds validity of Regulation 5.8(vii)(a) of the GNA Regulations, 2022, sets aside Single Judge’s directions permitting CTUIL to process Renewable Power Park Developer’s (RPPD) applications without prior government authorisation

In a common judgment dated 28.08.2026 in Writ Appeal (“W.A.”) No. 1961 of 2025 and seven connected appeals, the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court has upheld the constitutional validity of Regulation 5.8(vii)(a) of the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (Connectivity and General Network Access to the Inter-State Transmission System) Regulations, 2022 (“GNA Regulations”), rejecting the challenge raised by M/s Rays Power Infra Limited (“RPIL”) that the provision offends Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

By allowing the appeals filed by Central Transmission Utility of India Limited (“CTUIL”), the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court has set aside the common order dated 09.09.2025 passed by the Learned Single Judge to the extent it directed CTUIL to restore and reconsider RPIL’s connectivity applications and to reserve transmission capacity in RPIL’s favour at the Tumkur-II and Bellary sub-stations, notwithstanding the absence of the government authorisation mandated under Regulation 5.8(vii)(a).

Brief Background

The concept of a Power Park Developer authorised to seek connectivity to the Inter-State Transmission System (“ISTS”) on behalf of multiple generating stations was introduced by the Fifth Amendment to the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (Grant of Connectivity, Long-term Access and Medium-term Open Access in inter-State Transmission and related matters) Regulations, 2009, notified on 15.05.2015, confined initially to a Solar Power Park Developer authorised by the Central Government. By the Seventh Amendment notified on 09.01.2019, the expression was widened to ‘Renewable Power Park Developer’ (“RPPD”) and the power to grant authorisation was extended to the State Governments as well. The GNA Regulations, which replaced the 2009 Regulations with effect from 07.06.2022, retained the requirement of governmental authorisation, presently contained in Regulation 5.8(vii)(a), as amended in 2023 and 2024.

RPIL, claiming to be an RPPD, proposed to establish renewable energy parks in Karnataka with connectivity to the ISTS at the Tumkur-II and Bellary pooling sub-stations. When the State Government and Karnataka Renewable Energy Development Limited (“KREDL”) did not act on its request for authorisation, RPIL instituted W.P. No. 21533/2024 and thereafter applied to CTUIL for connectivity without furnishing the authorisation. Treating the absence of authorisation as a “major deficiency” under the amended Regulation 3.5 of the GNA Regulations, CTUIL closed the applications by orders dated 30.08.2024, 02.09.2024 and 09.09.2024. RPIL and its SPVs also instituted Writ Petition (“W.P.”) No. 35002/2024 seeking a time-bound direction to the State Government to grant the authorisation, in the course of which interim orders were passed reserving 890 MW at Tumkur-II and 600 MW at Bellary for the petitioners.

By the common order dated 09.09.2025, the Learned Single Judge partly allowed the writ petitions. Relying on Reliance Energy Limited v. Maharashtra State Road Development Corporation Ltd., (2007) 8 SCC 1, the Learned Single Judge held that RPIL had been denied a level playing field since the GNA Regulations prescribed no timeline for grant of authorisation, extended the interim reservation of capacity and consequently set aside CTUIL’s orders dated 30.08.2024, 02.09.2024, 09.09.2024 and directed CERC and CTUIL to reconsider RPIL’s applications and grant in-principle approval, subject to RPIL eventually obtaining the authorisation. The Learned Single Judge, however, did not specifically strike down or read down Regulation 5.8(vii)(a).

Aggrieved by this common order, CTUIL preferred Writ Appeal contending that the Single Judge could not have issued directions inconsistent with a Regulation whose validity had been left undisturbed.

1. RPPD and Renewable Generators are not similarly placed, no violation of Article 14

Examining the challenge on the touchstone of the settled principles governing judicial review of subordinate legislation, as laid down in Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Private Limited v. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 641, State of A.P. v. McDowell and Company, (1996) 3 SCC 709, and Shayara Bano v. Union of India, AIR 2017 SC 4609, the Appellate Court held that subordinate legislation can be invalidated only where it is ultra vires the parent statute, unconstitutional, in excess of the delegated power, or manifestly arbitrary, and that a regulation cannot be struck down merely because the Court considers it unwise or capable of improvement.

Applying this test, the Division Bench held that the distinction drawn between an RPPD and a renewable energy developer is “neither artificial nor illusory”, since an RPPD develops common infrastructure, acquires land, and provides pooling arrangements to facilitate several generating stations within an integrated park, thereby occupying a distinct position in the regulatory framework. The Division Bench held that the requirement of prior government authorisation ensures that only projects recognised by the Appropriate Government are treated as renewable power parks for the purpose of seeking connectivity on behalf of multiple generating stations, a classification resting on an intelligible differentia bearing a rational nexus with the object of orderly development of the transmission network and avoidance of speculative blocking of transmission capacity. The continuity of requirement since 2015, through successive amendments was also held to demonstrate that it forms part of a considered legislative policy rather than an arbitrary stipulation.

2. Learned Single Judge could not direct CTUIL to act contrary to a Regulation whose validity was left undisturbed

The Division Bench held that once Regulation 5.8(vii)(a) was found to be constitutionally valid, its implementation necessarily followed and CTUIL, being the statutory/nodalimplementing authority under Section 38 of the Electricity Act, 2003, with no independent power to waive, relax or ignore a mandatory regulatory requirement could not have been directed to restore and process RPIL’s applications in the absence of the authorisation. The Division Bench observed that although the Single Judge had “consciously declined to strike down or read down” the Regulation, the consequential directions issued nevertheless had the effect of compelling CTUIL to act contrary to it and that such directions, “though equitable in appearance, have the effect of rendering statutory requirements otiose”.

The Division Bench also rejected the contention that CERC ought to have exercised its powers of relaxation and removal of difficulty under Regulations 41 and 42 of the GNA Regulations in RPIL’s favour, noting that RPIL’s representation seeking relaxation had in fact been considered and rejected by CERC by order dated 11.04.2025, and that such enabling powers, vested in the regulator, cannot be exercised by a Court in substitution of the Regulator.

The judgment reaffirms that the requirement of prior government authorisation for a RPPD under Regulation 5.8(vii)(a) of the GNA Regulations rests on a valid and rational classification distinguishing such developers from ordinary renewable energy generators and that courts exercising judicial review cannot, without disturbing the validity of a subordinate regulation, issue directions that have the practical effect of dispensing with its mandatory requirements, while nevertheless flagging the need for the appropriate government to put in place a transparent and time-bound procedure for grant of such authorisation.

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PSERC Holds Pre-Existing PPAs Without a Change in Law Clause Bind the Parties, Dismisses Solar Generators’ Claim for Pass-Through of RCM-GST on Land Lease Rentals

By a common order dated 19.08.2026, the Punjab State Electricity Regulatory Commission (“State Commission”) has dismissed the Petitions filed by Vector Green Sunshine Pvt. Ltd. (“VGSPL”) and Anr. against Punjab State Power Corporation Limited (“PSPCL”) and Punjab Energy Development Agency (“PEDA”), holding that the Petitioners’ claim for additional payments or tariff adjustment on account of change in law events, is contrary to the agreed terms of the PPAs and is accordingly not maintainable.

By way of Petition Nos. 22 of 2026 and 23 of 2026, the Petitioners had sought, inter alia, a direction to PSPCL to pass through the additional expenditure incurred on account of GST payable under RCM on rent paid for land taken on lease from unregistered lessors, along with carrying cost/interest either under Regulation 23 of the CERC (Terms and Conditions for Tariff Determination from Renewable Energy Sources) Regulations, 2012 (“RE Tariff Regulations”), or as a Change in Law under the Electricity (Timely Recovery of Costs due to Change in Law) Rules, 2021 (“CIL Rules”) or in the alternative, through exercise of the State Commission’s general regulatory powers.

Brief Background

The Petitioner was awarded Solar PV Power Projects by PEDA pursuant to a Request for Proposal (“RfP”) issued under the Government of Punjab’s NRSE Policy 2012 with the final tariff arrived at after adjustment of the discount offered by the Petitioners on the generic levelised tariffs determined by the State Commission under the RE Tariff Regulations.

Vide Notification dated 08.10.2024, MoF brought “service by way of renting any property other than residential dwelling” within the RCM. Consequent thereto, the Petitioners, having taken project land on lease from unregistered lessors, became liable to discharge GST at 18% under RCM on the lease rentals. The Petitioners issued Change in Law notices to PSPCL on 29.04.2025, which PSPCL disputed on the ground that the PPAs contained no Change in Law provision and that leasing, rather than purchasing, land was a commercial decision of the Petitioners.

1. Absence of a Change in Law clause in the PPAs

The Petitioners contended that since the PPAs contained no provision restricting or barring a Change in Law claim, they were entitled to relief. PSPCL’s case, on the other hand, was that the express tariff clause together with the absence of a Change in Law clause reflected the parties’ clear intention to freeze the tariff and allocate the risk of future statutory fiscal changes to the Petitioners.

Examining Article 2.1.1(ii) of the PPAs, which provides that “the tariff shall remain constant throughout the Tariff Period following the year of commissioning” and that “no additional payment shall on any account be payable by PSPCL” read with Article 29.1.0 (Entire Agreement) and Article 31.0.0 (No Party Deemed Drafter), the State Commission held that the PPAs stipulate that no additional payment is payable by PSPCL on any account. The State Commission accordingly held the Petitioners’ plea that the PPAs contain no restricting provision to be “misconceived and unsustainable” also noting that the model PPA containing this tariff provision formed part of the bidding documents.

2. Applicability of the CIL Rules, 2021 to pre-existing PPAs

The Petitioners argued that, in the absence of a Change in Law provision in the PPAs, the CIL Rules 2021, being statutory and having overriding effect would independently apply to the Notification dated 08.10.2024.

Relying on the Supreme Court’s judgment in Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited v. Renew WindEnergy (Rajkot) Private Limited (2023), which holds that where PPAs are “entered into in the exercise of equal bargaining power…within the framework of existing regulations…unless any later amendment expressly overrides existing contracts, the terms of such agreements bind the parties,” and as further explained by APTEL in M/s Rosa Power Supply Co. Ltd. v. UPPCL & UPERC (2025), the State Commission held that in the absence of any express provision in the CIL Rules stating that they would override existing PPAs, and given the specific stipulation in the present PPAs that no additional payment is payable by PSPCL, “the CIL Rules 2021 do not override the provisions of the PPAs in the present case and the existing PPAs shall remain fully applicable and binding upon the parties.”

3. Regulation 23 of the RE Tariff Regulations, 2012

The Petitioners contended that the pass-through of RCM-GST was allowable under Regulation 23 of the RE Tariff Regulations, which excludes taxes and duties from the tariff. PSPCL’s response was that Regulation 3 of the RE Tariff Regulations confines their application to tariffs determined under Section 62, whereas the Petitioners’ tariff was discovered by way of a discount offered on the generic tariff pursuant to a bidding process conducted by PEDA.

Referring to its own Suo-Motu Order dated 19.07.2012 in Petition No. 35 of 2012, the State Commission held that bidding on the basis of a discount to the generic ceiling tariff, as directed by the State Commission itself, squarely amounts to determination of tariff under Section 63, rejecting the Petitioners’ plea to the contrary. The State Commission further held, relying on the Statement of Objects and Reasons to the RE Tariff Regulations, that Regulation 23 does not extend to taxes such as excise duty, sales tax and other levies that already form part of the normative capital cost, of which land is an enumerated component and observed that since the Petitioners had themselves justified leasing land as being more economical and instrumental to bidding a lower tariff, permitting a subsequent claim for the consequential GST liability “would tantamount to vitiating the entire competitive process” to the detriment of other bidders who structured their bids differently.

4. Exercise of the State Commission’s general regulatory power

As an alternate prayer, the Petitioners sought exercise of the State Commission’s general regulatory power under Section 86 of the Electricity Act, 2003 read with Regulations 69 and 71 of the PSERC (Conduct of Business) Regulations, 2005, contending that the absence of any provision addressing a post-bid Change in Law event made this a fit case for such intervention.

The Sztate Commission held that Section 86(1)(e) of the Electricity Act does not envisage grant of enhanced tariff and that the “difficulty” contemplated under the power to remove difficulty is one arising in giving effect to the Regulations and not one arising from application of the Regulations, as held by APTEL in Ratnagiri Gas and Power Private Ltd. Distinguishing the Supreme Court’s ruling in PGCIL v. Madhya Pradesh Power Transmission Company Ltd. & Ors.(2025) as applicable only to a situation involving an “unprecedented event not covered by any guidelines, regulations or contractual provisions”, the State Commission held that the present case, by contrast, concerned PPAs that explicitly and unequivocally provided that no additional payment would be payable by PSPCL. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited v. Solar Semiconductor Power Company (India) Private Limited and Others (2017), the State Commission held that its regulatory powers “cannot travel beyond its own procedure so as to alter the terms and conditions of the PPA” and cannot be invoked “to substantially alter the terms of the contract between the parties so as to prejudice the interest of the consumers ultimately.”

The State Commission accordingly dismissed the Petitioners’ claim seeking additional payments or tariff adjustment on account of the Central Notification dated 08.10.2024 as being contrary to the agreed terms of the PPAs.

 

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APTEL rules on Section 79(1)(f) of the Electricity Act, 2003: No Automatic Reference to Arbitration in Composite PPA Disputes

In a landmark judgment dated 25.02.2026, the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (Appellate Tribunal) has ruled in favour of the Punjab State Power Corporation Limited (PSPCL) and the Haryana Discoms (UHBVNL and DHBVNL, through HPPC), setting aside the order passed by the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC).

The CERC, in its common order dated 19.11.2025, had directed that the disputes between the procurers and Tata Power Company Limited (TPCL) regarding the short-supply of contracted electricity be mandatorily resolved through arbitration. By allowing Appeal Nos. 371 and 400 of 2025 filed by the Haryana Utilities and PSPCL respectively, the Appellate Tribunal has reaffirmed the exclusive adjudicatory jurisdiction of the Regulatory Commissions over matters impacting public interest and tariff. 

1. Impermissibility of Splitting Causes of Action

One of the central issues in the appeals filed by PSPCL and HPPC was the CERC’s erroneous decision to bifurcate their petitions. Both utilities had sought compensation jointly and severally against TPCL and the Western Regional Load Despatch Centre (WRLDC), a statutory body. PSPCL and HPPC’s grievance was that while TPCL illegally ceased generating and supplying their contracted capacities (475 MW for PSPCL and 380 MW for HPPC), WRLDC failed in its statutory duty under Section 28 of the Electricity Act to ensure proportionate scheduling.

The CERC had attempted to refer the dispute against TPCL to arbitration, while leaving the procurers to file separate petitions against WRLDC.

Relying on the Supreme Court’s rulings in Sukanya Holdings and Vidya Drolia, the Appellate Tribunal held that Section 8 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 does not permit the bifurcation of a cause of action or the splitting of a suit between parties to an arbitration agreement (TPCL) and non-parties (WRLDC). Because WRLDC discharges statutory functions making disputes against it non-arbitrable, and since the monetary claims were joint and several against TPCL and WRLDC. 

2. Strict Compliance with Section 8 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996

The Appellate Tribunal also ruled on the procedural mandates of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (the “1996 Act”). The Appellate Tribunal held that the provisions of Section 8(1) of the 1996 Act apply strictly to proceedings before the CERC.

Under Section 8(1), a party seeking to invoke arbitration must apply not later than the date of submitting its first statement on the substance of the dispute. In the present batch of cases, TPCL completely failed to make such an application before filing its reply to the petitions instituted by PSPCL and HPPC. Furthermore, TPCL had even filed its own independent petition before the CERC. The Appellate Tribunal held that non-compliance with the mandatory timeline under Section 8(1) vitiated the CERC’s decision to refer the dispute to arbitration.

3. CERC cannot refer a dispute to Arbitration if it lacks Adjudicatory Jurisdiction

The CERC had held that because the disputes were “non-tariff” contractual breaches, it lacked the jurisdiction to adjudicate them, and was therefore “bound” to refer them to arbitration under the second limb of Section 79(1)(f) of the Electricity Act.

The Appellate Tribunal rejected the CERC’s view that it could refer disputes to arbitration merely because it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate them holding that the power to refer a dispute to arbitration is not independent of the power to adjudicate. Reaffirming the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in GUVNL v. Essar, APTEL noted that the word “and” in Section 79(1)(f) must be read as “or”. This grants the CERC the discretion to eitheradjudicate a dispute or refer it to arbitration.

The Appellate Tribunal established that the CERC can only refer those disputes to arbitration which it is legally empowered to adjudicate under clauses (a) to (d) of Section 79(1). If the CERC lacks inherent jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute, it simultaneously lacks the jurisdiction to refer that very dispute to arbitration.

4. Tariff and Regulatory Disputes are Non-Arbitrable

The Appellate Tribunal reiterated that the Electricity Act is a special enactment designed to protect public interest and consumers. Any dispute that concerns the regulatory functions of the Commission, or impacts the tariff of a generating company (either directly or indirectly), must be exclusively adjudicated by the Regulatory Commissions and cannot be relegated to a private Arbitral Tribunal.

By setting aside the CERC’s order dated 19.11.2025, the Appellate Tribunal has restored all petitions to CERC. The CERC is now directed to examine whether the subject matter of the disputes falls within the ambit of Section 79(1)(b) of the Electricity Act. If the disputes impact tariff or touch upon regulatory functions, the CERC is mandated to adjudicate them itself.

The judgment highlights the statutory limits on arbitral reference under Section 79(1)(f) of the Electricity Act, 2003 and clarifies the interface between the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and the Electricity Act, 2003, reinforcing the primacy of regulatory adjudication in statutory disputes.

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APTEL Reaffirms Statutory Primacy: Relinquishment Charges Upheld Despite Force Majeure

The dispute centred around the grant of Long-Term Access (‘LTA’) and the execution of a Bulk Power Transmission Agreement (‘BPTA’) between Aryan Renewable Energy Private Limited (‘Aryan Renewable’) and Central Transmission Utility (‘CTU’) for evacuation of power from Aryan Renewable’s proposed 1200 MW thermal power project at Amelia, Madhya Pradesh.

Background

Aryan Renewable proposed to set up a 1200 MW thermal power project in Madhya Pradesh and was granted LTA for the evacuation of power through the inter-State transmission system. Pursuant to the grant of LTA, a BPTA was executed, and the Appellant furnished a bank guarantee towards its transmission obligations.

Subsequently, the Central Water Commission declined to grant the No-Objection Certificate for water drawal, rendering the project non-implementable. Aryan Renewable contended that this constituted a force majeure event and that no unit of the generating station ever achieved commercial operation.

Thereafter, the bank guarantee submitted by Aryan Renewable were invoked, and the Central Electricity Regulation Commission (‘CERC’), vide the Impugned Order, held that Aryan Renewable remained liable to pay transmission and relinquishment charges under Regulation 18 of the Connectivity Regulations, 2009. Aggrieved, Aryan Renewable preferred an Appeal before the Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal.

Issues Framed by the Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal

1. Whether Regulation 18 of the Connectivity Regulations, 2009 applies to a “zero-day failure” case, where LTA was never availed due to Force Majeure?
2. Whether binding precedent by this Hon’ble Tribunal exists on the above
3. Whether independently of precedent, the text of Regulation 18 contains a casus omissus regarding zero-use scenarios due to force majeure events, which is governed exclusively by the BPTA
4. Whether Force Majeure under the BPTA overrides the statutory obligation to pay relinquishment charges under Regulation 18?

Analysis

Issue 1: Applicability of Regulation 18 to “zero-day failure” 

1(a): Whether binding precedent exists

Aryan Renewable’s case primarily rests on Brahmani Thermal Power Private Limited v. CERC & Ors. passed by the Appellate Tribunal [Judgement dated 20.03.2025], where Regulation 18 was interpreted as—

(i) it applies solely to voluntary relinquishment of LTA “out of its wish”, having “no application” to compulsory exits due to unforeseeable force majeure events beyond control; 

(ii) it presupposes actual stranded transmission capacity from such relinquishment, which is absent if lines are not commissioned or are utilised by others; and 

(iii) LTA granted to generators activates only post-commercial operation, so no transmission charges liability arises where force majeure prevents project establishment altogether.

Aryan Renewable also relied on PEL Power Ltd. v. CERC and Himachal Sorang Power Pvt. Ltd. v. CERC, arguing that these decisions collectively constitute binding precedent excluding ‘zero-use’ cases from the scope of Regulation 18. The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal rejected this submission. It noted that the judgments relied upon did not consider the full statutory framework of the Connectivity Regulations, 2009, particularly the interrelationship between Regulations 14, 15 and 18. The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal held that the Brahmanijudgment impermissibly read additional words into Regulation 18 by restricting its application to voluntary relinquishment alone, contrary to settled principles of statutory interpretation. The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal reiterated that a judgment is binding only for what it actually decides, and observations made without consideration of relevant statutory provisions do not qualify. 

1(b): Whether the text of Regulation 18 contains a casus omissus

Independently, Aryan Renewable contended that Regulation 18 uses the phrase “have availed access rights” in both its categories, implying the provision applies only where access has been operationalised, and that a zero-use case therefore, falls outside its scope as a casus omissus.

The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal rejected this contention. Through a harmonised reading of the definitions of ‘LTA’ and “long-term customer” under the Connectivity Regulations, 2009, the Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal held that the right to use the inter-State transmission system is conferred upon grant of LTA by the CTU, which is thereafter formalised through execution of the BPTA under Regulation 15. Regulation 14 was construed to distinguish between the grant of access and the date from which such access becomes operational.

The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal held that where access is relinquished after grant but before commissioning, the period of utilisation is necessarily zero years, which squarely falls within Regulation 18(1)(b), applicable to customers who have not availed access rights for at least twelve years. Consequently, the zero-day failure scenario is not an omitted case under the Regulations, and the plea of casus omissus was found to be without merit.

2. Whether Force Majeure under the BPTA overrides the statutory obligation to pay relinquishment charges under Regulation 18

Aryan Renewable argued that Clause of the BPTA dealing with force majeure operates as an overriding provision absolving it from all liabilities, including relinquishment charges. TheHon’ble Appellate Tribunal rejected this submission by emphasising the primacy of statutory regulations over contractual arrangements.

The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal relied on the Constitution Bench decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in PTC India Ltd. v. CERC to reiterate that regulations framed under Section 178 of the Electricity Act, 2003, have the force of subordinate legislation and override contractual provisions.

The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal further held that Clause of the BPTA merely exempts parties from claims for loss or damage arising from force majeure and does not extend to statutory transmission or relinquishment charges, which form part of a pooled, non-discriminatory transmission framework. Transmission charges are not payable to CTU alone but are shared among Designated ISTS Customers under the Sharing Regulations, and therefore cannot be characterised as contractual damages.

In the absence of a force majeure exception in Regulation 18 itself, and given the statutory treatment of the Connectivity Regulations, the Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal concluded that Clauses of the BPTA cannot override the obligation to pay relinquishment charges under Regulation 18(1)(b). The appeal was therefore, dismissed as being devoid of merit.

Conclusion

The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal judgment placed an emphasis on the statutory nature of the Connectivity Regulations 2009, making it clear that they were not to be superseded by the BPTA, and that there was no cassus omissus in Regulation 18 underlining the importance of construing the same in a harmonious matter.

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APTEL Tightens the Screws on Public Interest Litigation: Strict Locus Standi Now Mandatory in Electricity Matters

I. Introduction

The Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (“APTEL”) reaffirmed in its April 8, 2025 judgment that public interest organizations must comply with stringent statutory locus standi criteria under the Electricity Act, 2003 (“Act”) when challenging regulatory orders. Mere altruistic intent does not equate to legal standing.

This analysis assesses APTEL’s ruling—its legal reasoning, statutory underpinnings, and broader implications for public-interest litigation in the power sector.

II. Statutory & Regulatory Framework

1. Section 2(15) defines “consumer” as any person supplied electricity for his own use.
   
2. Section 111 permits appeals before APTEL by “any person aggrieved” by orders of Appropriate Commissions.
   
3. The CERC/State ERC Conduct of Business Regulations often allow consumer representation but require formal legal standing, not just goodwill.
   

Section 111’s qualifier—“aggrieved”—imposes both legal injury and direct effect requirements.

III. Facts: Review by Surat Citizens Council Trust

• APTEL had earlier dismissed Appeal No 341 of 2017, where the Surat Citizens Council Trust challenged tariff orders by GERC, alleging broad public harm.
  
• The Trust was not a direct consumer and lacked mandates in its object clause to represent tariff payers.
  
• The Trust periodically obtained RTI information and audit data, but did not hold consumer status.
  

It approached APTEL via a review petition, invoking public interest and systemic grievances—a plea the Tribunal firmly rejected.

IV. APTEL’s Legal Findings

1. Strict Statutory Standing: Under Section 2(15), absence of consumer status meant the Trust was not “aggrieved” under Section 111.
   
2. No Representative Authority: Its governing documents included no mandate to represent affected consumers.
   
3. No Direct Injury: Lacked evidence showing tariff harm, either personal or through members.
   
4. Public Interest Alone Insufficient: Motivations, however noble, cannot replace statutory prerequisites.
   
5. Inadmissible Review Relief: Review petitions cannot re-litigate merits beyond correcting “error apparent on face.” The Trust’s new submissions were too late and not ground for review.

V. Judicial Reasoning: Public Interest vs. Legal Standing

APTEL drew a clear distinction between:

• Abstract or derivative harm, which is inadmissible; and
  
• Concrete, direct legal injury, which satisfies locus standi.
  

The Tribunal cited precedent from both electricity law and general administrative law to clarify that mere public spiritedness cannot override statutory architecture. In particular, it relied on the legal position in:

• Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, (1976) 1 SCC 671 – wherein the Supreme Court rejected “busybody” litigants lacking direct grievance.
  
• PTC India Ltd. v. CERC, (2010) 4 SCC 603 – which defined the scope of regulatory jurisdiction and clarified statutory appellate paths under the Electricity Act.
  

The ruling squarely rejected the notion that public interest is a standalone ground for approaching APTEL without complying with the substantive requirements of the Act.

VI. Procedural Takeaways

The Tribunal provided guidance for public interest groups wishing to approach electricity tribunals:

1. Object Clause Alignment: The organization’s charter must show a clear mandate to represent electricity consumers or affected stakeholders.
   
2. Proof of Injury or Representation: Entities must demonstrate:
   • A direct relationship to the impugned order; or
     
   • Authorization from identified consumer groups.
3. Participatory Prerequisite: Participation in the original regulatory proceedings before the SERC or CERC is essential. Post-facto intervention is rarely permitted.
   
4. No Collateral Appeals: Entities cannot repackage generalized grievances to reopen decisions already adjudicated.
   

This procedural discipline preserves the limited judicial bandwidth of APTEL for truly aggrieved persons, ensuring that regulatory stability is not undermined by unvetted interventions.

VII. Policy Context: Rise in NGO and Trust Interventions

In recent years, several NGOs, citizen forums, and local trusts have begun using the Electricity Act’s appeal provisions to challenge tariff orders, PPAs, and procurement guidelines—often citing environmental or public affordability concerns.

While such interventions can add valuable perspective, APTEL’s ruling underscores that such efforts must be institutionally disciplined. Courts and tribunals cannot act as policy forums or oversight bodies unless approached by legally competent persons or groups.

VIII. Impact on Public Interest Litigation in the Power Sector

The APTEL judgment will likely curb indiscriminate filing of appeals and reviews by public interest organizations that do not meet the minimum statutory thresholds. Key implications include:

a) Enhanced Gatekeeping

Electricity sector regulators and tribunals will adopt a stricter filter while examining the maintainability of petitions filed in the name of public interest. This ensures judicial economy, reduces backlog, and preserves the integrity of sectoral adjudication.

b) Higher Compliance Burden on NGOs

Organizations seeking to represent consumer interests in tariff matters must now align their incorporation documents, obtain mandates from affected groups, and demonstrate direct or representative standing. Casual or peripheral involvement will no longer suffice.

c) Clarity on Review Jurisdiction

The judgment also clarifies the limited scope of review under APTEL’s procedural rules. Review petitions are not a substitute for appeal, and any attempt to reopen findings without pointing to an evident error or omission will be summarily dismissed.

d) Sectoral Certainty

The ruling stabilizes regulatory processes in the electricity sector by preventing ad hoc disruption of commission decisions via loosely framed PIL-type reviews. This is especially important in tariff fixation and grid planning, where long-term investments depend on regulatory predictability.

IX. Comparative Jurisprudence

The Tribunal’s approach aligns with the principles upheld in:

• Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary, (1992) 4 SCC 305 – holding that “public interest litigation is not a license for irresponsible litigation”.
  
• Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of West Bengal, (2004) 3 SCC 349 – where the Supreme Court cautioned against abuse of PIL to serve personal or political ends.
  

The power sector’s regulatory adjudication thus continues to follow the broader judicial movement toward structured, merit-based public litigation, discouraging speculative or ideologically motivated filings.

Conclusion

The April 2025 decision of APTEL in the Surat Citizens Council Trust matter marks a pivotal clarification in the domain of regulatory litigation. While it does not exclude public interest entities altogether, it mandates rigorous compliance with statutory locus standi.

This ruling preserves the integrity of the appellate framework under the Electricity Act, 2003 by ensuring that only persons with direct legal grievance or properly authorized representation may invoke appellate jurisdiction. In doing so, APTEL has drawn a necessary and constitutionally valid line between participatory governance and judicial intervention.

Going forward, electricity regulatory litigation in India will need to reflect structured advocacy, institutional mandate, and demonstrable harm—lest it be struck down at the threshold.

APTEL – Surat Citizens Council Trust (Review Petition No. 1 of 2025 in Appeal No. 341 of 2017) – https://aptel.gov.in/sites/default/files/2025-04/RP%201%20of%202025%20.pdf?

Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed & Ors. (1975) – https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1749406/

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Supreme Court rules in favour of the Powergrid Corporation of India Limited reinforcing regulatory role of the Central Commission Under Electricity Act, 2003

The Supreme Court today (May 15) ruled that the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) is not precluded from exercising its functions under Section 79 of the Electricity Act, 2003  in the absence of regulations framed under Section 178 of the Electricity Act, 2003. 

The Judgment arises out of the SLPs filed by Powergrid Corporation of India Limited (PGCIL) against the Order dated 25.02.2021 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh admitting the writ petitions filed by the Madhya Pradesh Power Transmission Company Limited (MPPTCL). 

MPPTCL had filed the Writ Petition before the High Court on the ground that the CERC had exercised powers  beyond its jurisdiction as per the regulations notified under Section 178 of the Electricity Act, 2003 while passing the orders dated 21.01.2020 and 27.01.2020 in Petition No. 311/TT/2018 and Petition No. 266/TT/2018 filed by PGCIL seeking transmission tariff for its assets.   

While setting aside the judgment dated 25.02.2021 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, the Supreme Court answered the following questions in favour of PGCIL:

i. Whether the CERC, while exercising its functions under Section 79(1) of   the Act, 2003, is circumscribed by statutory regulations enacted under   Section 178 of the Act, 2003?  

ii. Whether the CERC exercises regulatory or adjudicatory functions under   Section 79 of the Act, 2003? In other words, what is the scope of the CERC’s power to regulate inter-state transmission of electricity and determine tariff for the same under clauses (c) and (d) of Section 79(1)?

iii. Whether the grant of compensation by the CERC for the delay vide the orders dated 21.01.2020 and 27.01.2020 respectively, is a regulatory or adjudicatory function and to what extent are the principles of natural justice applicable to the exercise of such functions? 

iv. Whether the High Court was justified in admitting the writ petition filed by the respondent no. 1 herein challenging the order dated 21.01.2020 of the CERC when there existed an alternative remedy under Section 111 of   the Act, 2003?  

While dealing with the above questions, the Supreme Court has held as under:

a. CERC functions as both – decision-making and regulation-making authority under Section 79 and 178 of the Act, 2003 respectively.

b. While noting the Constitution Bench judgment in PTC India Limited v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (2010) 4 SCC 603, the Supreme Court has held that the Regulations under Section 178 has the effect of interfering with and overriding contractual relationships between the regulated entities, however, on the other hand the orders under Section 79 have to be confined to the existing statutory regulations and do not have the effect of altering the terms of contract between the specific parties before the CERC

c. In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in PTC and Energy Watchdog v. CERC reported in (2017) 14 SCC 80, it has been held that the absence of a regulation under Section 178 does not preclude the CERC from exercising its powers under Section 79(1) to make specific regulations or pass orders between the parties before it.

d. In the present case, the Supreme Court held that there is no contractual clause between the parties for establishing the risks of delay in commissioning of a transmission asset. There is also no uniform settled position as regards the liability of transmission charges payable before a particular transmission element is put in operation, in the form of regulations under Section 178. These circumstances, considered together with the prohibition on imposing liability of delayed payments on beneficiaries, leave a regulatory gap. The Supreme Court then proceeded to hold that in light of the dictum in the case of Energy Watchdog case, in the situation of an absence in Regulation, Guidelines or Contractual clauses, the Act, 2003 mandates that the CERC may strike a judicious balance keeping in mind commercial principles and consumers interest in exercise of its general regulatory powers under Section 79.

e. The Supreme Court further held that sources of power for enactment of a regulation under Section 178 and regulatory order under Section 79(1) are different. The   former emanates from the power of delegated legislation whereas the latter is an ad hoc power which is limited to the specific parties and situation in context of which the order is given. Since the regulatory powers under Section 79(1)  are of an ad hoc nature and are not of general application, the orders thereunder  are made appealable under Section 111.   

In light of the above findings, the Supreme Court held that CERC is empowered to order for imposition of transmission charges on the party to whom delay is attributable and there was no occasion for High Court to admit the Writ Petitions and CERC . The Supreme Court has concluded that APTEL is the appropriate authority to look into the merits of the matter should MPPTCL choose to prefer an appeal before APTEL under Section 111 of the Act, 2003.

The copy of the judgment has been directed to be circulated to all High Courts.  

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Supreme Court Upholds State Regulatory Oversight Over Inter-State Power Procurement Affecting Local Grid

The Supreme Court affirms that State Commissions can regulate inter-state electricity procurement affecting local grids. A landmark interpretation under the Electricity Act, 2003.

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