
The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal Upholds Admissibility of Price and Quantity Variations in Transmission Capital Cost: Feasibility Report Estimates Are Indicative, Not Sacrosanct
The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (“Appellate Tribunal”), by its judgment dated 9 September 2026 in TANGEDCO v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission & Ors., Appeal No. 230 of 2016, has upheld the capital cost approved for the Vallur Thermal Power Station (“TPS”)–Melakottaiyur 400 kV Double Circuit (“D/C”) transmission line, forming part of the supplementary transmission system associated with Vallur TPS in the Southern Region. The judgment affirms the position consistently advanced by Power Grid Corporation of India Limited (“POWERGRID”) that the estimates contained in a Feasibility Report (“FR”) are indicative in nature and that variations in quantities and prices arising during execution are admissible in the capital cost, subject to a prudence check of the actual expenditure incurred.
The appeal arose from the order dated 27 November 2015 passed by the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (“CERC”) in Petition No. 48/TT/2013, determining the tariff for the transmission line from its commercial operation date (“COD”) until 31 March 2014 under the CERC (Terms and Conditions of Tariff) Regulations, 2009. TANGEDCO challenged the approved completion cost of Rs.58.71 crore against the FR estimate of Rs.46.38 crore, representing an increase of approximately 26.58%. It also questioned the admissibility of Incidental Expenditure During Construction (“IEDC”) and contended that CERC had failed to provide adequate reasons for allowing the increase in capital cost.
POWERGRID’s Submissions Before Appellate Tribunal
1. Quantity Variations are an Inherent Feature of Transmission Projects
POWERGRID submitted that the quantities specified in the Feasibility Report (“FR”) are based on preliminary surveys and are indicative of the estimated project cost, with actual requirements ascertainable only after detailed surveys, route profiling and soil investigations. It further contended that Right of Way (“RoW”) constraints, particularly the approximately 46-metre RoW requirement for a 400 kV D/C transmission line under the CBIP Manual, may necessitate changes in alignment and additional towers, foundations, tower steel and insulators. Accordingly, the increase in quantities arising from actual site conditions could not be disallowed merely because it exceeded the preliminary estimates in the FR.
2. Price Variation Is Governed by Contractual Mechanisms and Actual Market Conditions
POWERGRID submitted that the increase in capital cost was attributable to fluctuations in the prices of key inputs, including steel, cement and aluminium, and was calculated in accordance with the price variation clauses incorporated in its supply contracts, using predetermined formulae and applicable indices, including those published by the Indian Electrical and Electronics Manufacturers’ Association (“IEEMA”). It placed the supporting indices and computation methodology before CERC through an affidavit dated 24.09.2015 and relied on Manchukonda Agrotech Pvt. Ltd. v. KERC, Appeal No. 259 of 2018, to support its contention that actual cost data, rather than preliminary estimates alone, must be considered while determining admissible expenditure.
3. Actual Capital Cost Is Admissible Subject to Prudence Check
POWERGRID submitted that Regulations 7 and 9 of the CERC (Terms and Conditions of Tariff) Regulations, 2009, require capital cost to be determined on the basis of actual expenditure, subject to prudence check, and that the increase over the FR estimate could not, by itself, justify disallowance of expenditure incurred for executing the project. It further contended that Incidental Expenditure During Construction (“IEDC”) is a recognised component of capital cost and is admissible in accordance with the applicable Tariff Regulations, the expenditure being duly supported by Auditor’s Certificates.
The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal’s Findings and Observations
The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal upheld the capital cost approved for the transmission asset and rejected TANGEDCO’s challenge, making the following key findings:
- The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal held that the quantities indicated in a Detailed Project Report (“DPR”) or preliminary estimate cannot be treated as an absolute ceiling on capital cost under Section 62 of the Electricity Act, 2003. Any increase in quantities must be assessed on the basis of actual project requirements and is admissible subject to prudence check under the applicable Tariff Regulations.
- The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal recognised the enforceability of contractually agreed price variation mechanisms. In the present case, POWERGRID relied on the Supply Contract Agreement dated 24.03.2011, which provided for price adjustment. After considering the applicable indices and calculations placed before CERC, the Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal rejected TANGEDCO’s objection to the application of price variation for the period from the first quarter of 2010 to October 2012.
- The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal upheld the determination of capital cost on the basis of actual expenditure, subject to regulatory scrutiny. It noted that CERC had considered TANGEDCO’s objections and POWERGRID’s explanations before accepting that the increase in cost arose from actual execution requirements and prevailing market conditions. However, the expenditure must be adequately substantiated and satisfy the prescribed prudence check.
- The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal held that the Comptroller and Auditor General’s Performance Audit Report No. 18 of 2014 could not, by itself, constitute sufficient grounds for disallowing an otherwise admissible increase in capital cost. The expenditure must instead be examined on the basis of project-specific circumstances, supporting evidence, contractual provisions and the applicable regulatory framework.
- The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal upheld the treatment of IEDC, which CERC had provisionally allowed at Rs. 464.55 lakh, within the stipulated limit of 5% of the hard cost, subject to furnishing year-wise actual expenditure at the time of true-up. The admissibility of IEDC remains subject to compliance with the applicable Tariff Regulations and verification of actual expenditure.
- While upholding the capital cost, the Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal observed that CERC should have provided more detailed reasons, particularly while dealing with substantial cost overruns. However, noting that tariff determination is a continuing process and that the asset had subsequently undergone tariff determination and true-up for later periods, the Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal exercised its appellate jurisdiction under Section 111 of the Electricity Act, 2003, to decide the dispute on merits rather than remand the matter for reconsideration.
The judgment affirms POWERGRID’s position that preliminary estimates in a Feasibility Report or Detailed Project Report cannot be treated as an inflexible ceiling on the capital cost of a transmission project. Variations in quantities arising from route realignment, Right of Way constraints, soil conditions and other site-specific requirements, as well as price variations permitted under contractual mechanisms, may legitimately contribute to an increase in the final project cost. However, such increases are not automatically admissible and must be supported by adequate evidence, comply with the contractual provisions and satisfy the prudence check prescribed under the applicable Tariff Regulations, thereby balancing the recovery of justified expenditure against the need to protect beneficiaries from imprudent or inadequately substantiated costs.
Further, by adjudicating the dispute on merits rather than remanding the tariff order dating back to 2015, the Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal has brought finality to the proceedings, notwithstanding the subsequent tariff determination and true-up of the asset. The judgment reinforces regulatory certainty for transmission licensees by recognising the practical realities of executing transmission projects while clarifying that the admissibility of capital cost must be determined on the basis of actual expenditure, its justification and regulatory prudence, rather than merely its deviation from preliminary estimates. It is, therefore, relevant to future tariff proceedings involving cost overruns attributable to genuine execution requirements and contractually permissible price variations.
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No Reopening of Settled Claims: PSERC Rejects a Fresh LPS Claim After the Appellate Tribunal’s Judgment Order dated 13 October 2026 | Petition No. 47 of 2026
The Punjab State Electricity Regulatory Commission (“PSERC”), vide its order dated 13 October 2026 in M/s Indian Sucrose Limited v. Punjab State Power Corporation Limited & Anr., dismissed a claim for Late Payment Surcharge (“LPS”).
Brief Facts
Indian Sucrose Limited had challenged the recovery of charges towards a 66 kV line and bay by PSPCL. The Appellate Tribunal, vide judgment dated 14 November 2024, directed PSPCL to charge only the depreciated book value of the line and bay and refund the excess amount. The Hon’ble Supreme Court dismissed PSPCL’s appeal against the judgment dated 14 November 2024.
Indian Sucrose thereafter approached PSERC under Section 86(1)(f) of the Electricity Act, 2003, seeking LPS at 15% per annum under the Short-Term Power Purchase Agreement , along with interest and carrying cost.
Findings of the Commission
PSERC held that Indian Sucrose had already sought interest on the excess recovery in the earlier proceedings before Appellate Tribunal. However, the Appellate Tribunal had directed only a refund of the excess amount and had not granted the additional monetary relief sought.
The Commission rejected the contention that the subsequent claim constituted an independent contractual claim for LPS. It observed that the claim arose from the same energy bills and recovery that had formed the subject matter of the earlier proceedings. A party could not reopen or enlarge the relief finally adjudicated by assigning a different nomenclature to the subsequent claim.
PSERC further held that its jurisdiction under Section 86(1)(f) could not be exercised to reopen, modify or supplement a final judgment of Appellate Tribunal. Consequently, the claims for LPS and interest were rejected and the petition was dismissed as not maintainable.
Key Takeaway
The order reiterates the importance of finality. Parties must carefully formulate all monetary reliefs in the original proceedings, as a subsequent claim under a contractual provision may not be maintainable where it seeks additional relief arising from the same transaction already finally adjudicated.
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APTEL Clarifies but Does Not Reopen, The Arbitrability Question Under Section 79(1)(f): Review Petition No. 6 of 2026
Tata Power Company Limited v. Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited & Ors., Review Petition No. 6 of 2026 decided on 17 September 2026
The Dispute
Tata Power sought review of Appellate Tribunal’s common judgment dated 25 February 2026 in Appeal Nos. 348 of 2025 & Batch. Tata Power contended that the judgment under review had described paragraph 36 of the Appellate Tribunal’s earlier judgment dated 28 August 2024 in Appeal No. 309 of 2019 (the DVC judgment) as a “stray sentence” and that conclusion of the judgment under review that only disputes falling within clauses (a) to (d) of Section 79(1) can be adjudicated by the Central Commission or referred to arbitration under Section 79(1)(f) was directly contrary to the DVC judgment of a coordinate bench, which the Judgement under Review could not dilute.
Paragraph 36 of the DVC judgment had recorded that non-tariff disputes involving a generating company or a distribution licensee do not fall within clause (f) of Section 79(1) and are thus arbitrable. The challenge to DVC judgment was dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 10480 of 2024.
The Law on Review
The Appellate Tribunal restated the settled position under Section 114 and Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC: an error apparent on the face of the record is one that is self-evident and not one established by a long-drawn process of reasoning, review corrects a patent mistake but does not substitute a view and a review petition cannot become an appeal in disguise.
Findings on the Substantive Ground
The Appellate Tribunal declined to disturb the reasoning of the judgment under review. The Appellate Tribunal held that since the Central Commission can adjudicate only disputes falling under clauses (a) to (d) of Section 79(1), its referral power is confined to the same category. The identically worded second limb of Section 86(1)(f) was read in the same manner, the Appellate Tribunal noting that a contrary construction would create concurrent referral jurisdiction between the Central and State Commissions and would permit a State Commission to refer disputes falling wholly outside its State.
On Renew Wind Energy (AP2) (P) Ltd. v. Solar Energy Corporation of India, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 8252, the Appellate Tribunal held that the Hon’ble High Court’s attention had not been drawn to Hindustan Zinc Ltd. v. Ajmer Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd., (2019) 17 SCC 82 and that the Appellate Tribunal was bound to follow the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
The Appellate Tribunal held that the judgment under review does not contradict the DVC judgment but is clarificatory of it, explaining its actual purport and observed that the clarification “ought to have been given in the DVC judgment itself”.
The Appellate Tribunal recorded its disapproval at paragraph 36 of the DVC judgment being characterised as a “stray sentence”, holding that the paragraph contained the final view of the Appellate Tribunal on arbitrability and that without it the DVC judgment would be inchoate. That characterisation was held to be an error apparent on the face of the record and those observations alone were set aside. The review petition was thereafter dismissed.
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An Unchallenged Regulatory Order Bars a Fresh Petition on the Same Tariff — Appeal No. 325 of 2026
Haryana Power Purchase Centre v. M/s Siwana Solar Power Projects Ltd. & Haryana Electricity Regulatory Commission decided on 18 September 2026
Background
HPPC and Siwana executed a PPA in 2014 for a 5 MW solar plant. Clause 4.1 fixed the applicable tariff as the lowest of three options: the HERC (State Commission) generic tariff, the lowest tariff accepted in HPPC’s first long-term competitive bidding tender, or the lowest tariff in HAREDA’s first reverse-bidding tender. A tariff of Rs. 6.44/kWh was discovered. HERC, by order dated 20.01.2026, held Siwana bound by the PPA and directed year-to-year tariff corresponding to a levelized Rs. 6.44/kWh. That order was upheld by Appellate Tribunal for Electricity on 27.05.2019 in Appeal No. 150 of 2016.
Separately, PPAs with four other developers under the same tender were initially rejected by HERC and Appellate Tribunal by judgment dated 09.03.2018 in Appeal Nos. 278 and 307 of 2016 directed their approval at Rs. 5.68/kWh. The Hon’ble Supreme Court dismissed the developers’ appeals on 10.10.2023. HPPC thereafter paid Siwana at Rs. 5.68/kWh and HERC by order dated 10.05.2019 permitted that rate as an interim arrangement.
Siwana’s Petition No. 26 of 2024, seeking implementation of Rs. 6.44/kWh was dismissed in limine by HERC on 12.11.2024 on the principles of res judicata. No appeal was filed against that order. Siwana then filed Petition No. 78 of 2025 and HERC by the impugned order dated 14.05.2026 granted Rs. 6.44/kWh from 1 April 2019, with differential tariff, interest at 9.15% per annum and late payment surcharge.
Findings
On res judicata. HERC’s order dated 12.11.2024 had held that the sum and substance of all of Siwana’s petitions was the grant of Rs. 6.44/kWh, that the issue had attained finality and that res judicata applied. That order went unchallenged. Comparing the prayers in Petition No. 26 of 2024 and Petition No. 78 of 2025, the Appellate Tribunal found them identical, the parties the same and the subject-matter the same. Applying Section 11 CPC and Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai v. Mohd. Hanifa, (1976) 4 SCC 780, Satyadhyan Ghosal v. Deorajin Debi, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 15, Sulochana Amma v. Narayanan Nair, (1994) 2 SCC 14, Swamy Atmananda v. Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam, (2005) 10 SCC 51, Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar, (2005) 1 SCC 787 and M. Nagabhushana v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 3 SCC 408, the Appellate Tribunal held that the doctrine operates even where the earlier decision may be erroneous, the remedy lying in appeal or review and not in fresh litigation.
The “past dues versus prospective tariff” distinction drawn by HERC in the impugned order was held to be legally unsustainable. The impugned order was set aside.
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APTEL Sets Aside APERC’s Deduction of Variable Charges for Monthly Availability Shortfall: Energy Charges Cannot Be Penalised
The Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (“Appellate Tribunal”) in its judgment dated 03.07.2026, has ruled in favour of Hinduja National Power Corporation Limited (“HNPCL”), setting aside the order dated 30.12.2025 passed by the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission (“APERC”), to the extent it directed deductions from HNPCL’s variable charges on account of shortfall in monthly plant availability.
By allowing Appeal No. 27 of 2026, the Appellate Tribunal has held that under the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (Terms and Conditions of Tariff) Regulations, 2024, the APERC Regulations of 2008, and the Power Purchase Agreement (“PPA”) dated 16.07.2024 executed between the parties, only fixed/capacity charges are linked to plant availability, while energy charges are strictly linked to the scheduled energy actually supplied and cannot be reduced or penalised for a shortfall in monthly availability.
1. No Statutory or Contractual Basis for Deducting Variable Charges
APERC by way of the Impugned Order had directed the DISCOMs to apply graded deductions from the Variable Cost – 5paise per unit where the shortfall in actual monthly availability was up to 5% below the normative/target level, 10paise where the shortfall was between 5% and 15%, and 15paise where the shortfall exceeded 15%, with liberty to HNPCL to seek release of the withheld amounts by establishing that the underperformance was attributable to uncontrollable factors.
HNPCL contended that neither the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (Terms and Conditions of Tariff) Regulations, 2024 (adopted by APERC), nor the APERC Regulations, 2008, nor the PPA provide for any reduction in energy charges on account of a shortfall in availability, and that the deductions were consequently without statutory or contractual authority. HNCPL contended that Rs. 12.26 Crore had already been withheld from HNPCL’s bills for the months of December 2025 to February 2026.
2. Fixed Charges, Not Energy Charges, are Linked to Availability
Examining Regulation 15 and 16 read with Chapter 11 of the CERC Regulations, 2024, Clause 1.2.2 and 1.2.3 of Schedule-F of the PPA, and Regulations 11 to 13 of the APERC Regulations, 2008, the Appellate Tribunal held that the governing framework, whether under the CERC Regulations, the APERC Regulations, or the PPA executed between the parties expressly and unambiguously stipulates that monthly fixed charges are linked to the Plant Availability Factor for the month vis-à-vis the normative annual plant availability, whereas energy charges are linked solely to the fuel cost/energy charge rate applied to the quantum of energy actually supplied during the month, irrespective of the plant availability achieved in that month.
The Appellate Tribunal held that once the Regulations stipulate the manner of recovery of fixed cost and computation of energy charge, APERC has no jurisdiction to interfere with or modify that scheme by way of adjudication or in a tariff order, any departure can only be effected by way of a formal amendment to the Regulations, and not otherwise.
3. APERC cannot invoke Casus Omissus to fill a regulatory gap that does not exist
APERCS had contended that while the PPA and Regulations focus on annual normative availability, they do not preclude monthly adjustments, and that APERC, as a statutory body, is empowered and obligated to fill contractual and regulatory gaps to ensure reliable supply.
The Appellate Tribunal rejected this submission, holding that both the CERC and APERC Regulations clearly stipulate the methodology for recovery of energy charges for a given month, and once such methodology is prescribed, the Commission is bound to apply it in its entirety. The doctrine of casus omissus was held to have no application, since the Regulations are complete in themselves and leave no vacuum for the Commission to legislate by way of adjudication.
4. Parity with other generators cannot justify an unlawful deduction
APERC had sought to justify the deductions by referring to similar reductions applied to other Intra-State generators such as APGENCO. The Appellate Tribunal held that the application of a similar reduction to other generators is of no relevance, since those orders were not under challenge and the Appellate Tribunal was not bound to extend the same treatment to HNPCL merely because it had been applied elsewhere. The doctrine of “negative equality” or parity cannot be invoked to perpetuate an illegality or justify a deviation from the Regulations, and each appeal must be adjudicated on the basis of the statutory framework and the specific impugned order under consideration.
Accordingly, the Appellate Tribunal set aside the Impugned Order on this issue and directed that recovery of energy charges be enforced strictly in accordance with the applicable CERC Regulations and the PPA, with the Respondents directed to refund the amount deducted/withheld from HNPCL’s energy bills along with applicable carrying cost within four weeks from the date of the judgment.
5. Part load compensation, remanded for quantification only
HNPCL had also claimed Part Load Compensation (“PLC”) in terms of Clause 1.2.5 of Schedule-F of the PPA read with Regulation 6.3B of the CERC [Indian Electricity Grid Code(IEGC)] (Fourth Amendment) Regulations, 2016, on which the Impugned Order contained no discussion, analysis or finding, despite APERC having recorded HNPCL’s claim. The DISCOMs admitted that the Revised Consolidated PPA explicitly provides for part load compensation, but contended that no separate determination was required as PLC for the previous Control Period had been claimed as part of the True-Up process on an actual basis.
Finding no dispute with regard to HNPCL’s entitlement to Part Load Compensation, and noting that the controversy, if any, was confined only to quantification and reconciliation, the Appellate Tribunal held that HNPCL is entitled to Part Load Compensation in terms of the PPA and Regulation 6.3B of the IEGC (Fourth Amendment), 2016, and remanded the matter to APERC for determination and finalisation of the amount payable towards PLC.
The judgment reaffirms that in a statutory tariff regime, the mechanism prescribed under the Regulations and the PPA for recovery of fixed and energy charges must be followed strictly. It further clarifies that the doctrine of casus omissus cannot be invoked to fill a gap where none exists, and that parity with the treatment accorded to unrelated generators cannot be used to sustain an otherwise unlawful deduction.
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APTEL rules on Section 79(1)(f) of the Electricity Act, 2003: No Automatic Reference to Arbitration in Composite PPA Disputes
In a landmark judgment dated 25.02.2026, the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (Appellate Tribunal) has ruled in favour of the Punjab State Power Corporation Limited (PSPCL) and the Haryana Discoms (UHBVNL and DHBVNL, through HPPC), setting aside the order passed by the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC).
The CERC, in its common order dated 19.11.2025, had directed that the disputes between the procurers and Tata Power Company Limited (TPCL) regarding the short-supply of contracted electricity be mandatorily resolved through arbitration. By allowing Appeal Nos. 371 and 400 of 2025 filed by the Haryana Utilities and PSPCL respectively, the Appellate Tribunal has reaffirmed the exclusive adjudicatory jurisdiction of the Regulatory Commissions over matters impacting public interest and tariff.
1. Impermissibility of Splitting Causes of Action
One of the central issues in the appeals filed by PSPCL and HPPC was the CERC’s erroneous decision to bifurcate their petitions. Both utilities had sought compensation jointly and severally against TPCL and the Western Regional Load Despatch Centre (WRLDC), a statutory body. PSPCL and HPPC’s grievance was that while TPCL illegally ceased generating and supplying their contracted capacities (475 MW for PSPCL and 380 MW for HPPC), WRLDC failed in its statutory duty under Section 28 of the Electricity Act to ensure proportionate scheduling.
The CERC had attempted to refer the dispute against TPCL to arbitration, while leaving the procurers to file separate petitions against WRLDC.
Relying on the Supreme Court’s rulings in Sukanya Holdings and Vidya Drolia, the Appellate Tribunal held that Section 8 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 does not permit the bifurcation of a cause of action or the splitting of a suit between parties to an arbitration agreement (TPCL) and non-parties (WRLDC). Because WRLDC discharges statutory functions making disputes against it non-arbitrable, and since the monetary claims were joint and several against TPCL and WRLDC.
2. Strict Compliance with Section 8 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996
The Appellate Tribunal also ruled on the procedural mandates of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (the “1996 Act”). The Appellate Tribunal held that the provisions of Section 8(1) of the 1996 Act apply strictly to proceedings before the CERC.
Under Section 8(1), a party seeking to invoke arbitration must apply not later than the date of submitting its first statement on the substance of the dispute. In the present batch of cases, TPCL completely failed to make such an application before filing its reply to the petitions instituted by PSPCL and HPPC. Furthermore, TPCL had even filed its own independent petition before the CERC. The Appellate Tribunal held that non-compliance with the mandatory timeline under Section 8(1) vitiated the CERC’s decision to refer the dispute to arbitration.
3. CERC cannot refer a dispute to Arbitration if it lacks Adjudicatory Jurisdiction
The CERC had held that because the disputes were “non-tariff” contractual breaches, it lacked the jurisdiction to adjudicate them, and was therefore “bound” to refer them to arbitration under the second limb of Section 79(1)(f) of the Electricity Act.
The Appellate Tribunal rejected the CERC’s view that it could refer disputes to arbitration merely because it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate them holding that the power to refer a dispute to arbitration is not independent of the power to adjudicate. Reaffirming the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in GUVNL v. Essar, APTEL noted that the word “and” in Section 79(1)(f) must be read as “or”. This grants the CERC the discretion to eitheradjudicate a dispute or refer it to arbitration.
The Appellate Tribunal established that the CERC can only refer those disputes to arbitration which it is legally empowered to adjudicate under clauses (a) to (d) of Section 79(1). If the CERC lacks inherent jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute, it simultaneously lacks the jurisdiction to refer that very dispute to arbitration.
4. Tariff and Regulatory Disputes are Non-Arbitrable
The Appellate Tribunal reiterated that the Electricity Act is a special enactment designed to protect public interest and consumers. Any dispute that concerns the regulatory functions of the Commission, or impacts the tariff of a generating company (either directly or indirectly), must be exclusively adjudicated by the Regulatory Commissions and cannot be relegated to a private Arbitral Tribunal.
By setting aside the CERC’s order dated 19.11.2025, the Appellate Tribunal has restored all petitions to CERC. The CERC is now directed to examine whether the subject matter of the disputes falls within the ambit of Section 79(1)(b) of the Electricity Act. If the disputes impact tariff or touch upon regulatory functions, the CERC is mandated to adjudicate them itself.
The judgment highlights the statutory limits on arbitral reference under Section 79(1)(f) of the Electricity Act, 2003 and clarifies the interface between the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and the Electricity Act, 2003, reinforcing the primacy of regulatory adjudication in statutory disputes.
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The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal Dismisses Tspl’s Attempt To Expand Scope Of Appeal
Introduction
On 03.11.2025, the Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal of Electricity (the ‘Hon’ble Tribunal’) pronounced the judgment in the matter between Talwandi Sabo Power Limited (‘TSPL’) and Punjab State Electricity Regulatory Commission (the ‘State Commission’). While doing so, the Hon’ble Tribunal has ruled in the favour of Punjab State Power Corporation Limited (‘PSPCL’) and observed that the Application filed by TSPL seeking deemed capacity charges for the year 2014 on account of alleged failure on the part of PSPCL to arrange adequate quantity as well as quality of coal for its power project is beyond the scope of the present appeal. It also held that claims not pleaded or argued before the State Commission cannot be raised for the first time before the Hon’ble Tribunal.
Background
The appeal presently before the Hon’ble Tribunal arises from orders dated 06.09.2016 and 08.09.2016 passed by the State Commission in Petitions No. 11 of 2012 and 46 of 2012. These proceedings were remanded by the Hon’ble Tribunal through its judgment dated 07.04.2016 (in Appeal Nos. 56 & 84 of 2013) wherein the State Commission was required to pass consequential orders in terms of directions given in the remand judgment.
However, TSPL—nearly nine years later—attempted to inject a fresh, never sought claims relating to deemed capacity charges for the periods July–October 2014 and December 2014allegedly arising from PSPCL’s supposed failure to supply adequate coal.
This claim had its own separate procedural trajectory. TSPL had raised it only in Petition No. 34 of 2015, distinct from the present appeal, which the State Commission referred to arbitration in December 2015.
In the arbitral proceedings arising from the State Commission’s reference in Petition No. 34 of 2015, TSPL sought, by way of a belated amendment application filed on 20.01.2024, to introduce a new claim for deemed capacity charges for the 2014 period, a claim that had never formed part of the disputes originally referred to arbitration. The Arbitral Tribunal, by its order dated 31.07.2025, rejected the amendment, holding that the 2014 claim fell outside the scope of the reference and could not be imported through an afterthought pleading.
When the Arbitral Tribunal limited the scope of its jurisdiction to the terms of reference and declined to examine the 2014 deemed availability claim, TSPL attempted to bring the issue into the Appeal No. 331 of 2016 pending before the Hon’ble Tribunal, as a supplementary pleading through an I.A. for Urgent Listing filed in September, 2025.
Submission Made by the Parties
TSPL essentially argued as under:
- The company would be left “remediless” because the Arbitral Tribunal had declined to adjudicate it.
- The issue ought to be adjudicated to avoid multiplicity of proceedings.
- PSPCL had allegedly stated before the Arbitral Tribunal that the 2014 claim was “subsumed” within the pending appeal before the Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal.
- While the arbitral proceedings would address the plea of force majeure raised by it, the issue concerning PSPCL’s coal supply obligation for the year 2014 remained to be adjudicated on merits and, therefore, rightly falls within the scope of the present appeal for consideration by the Hon’ble Tribunal.
PSPCL’s key arguments were as under:
- The 2014 claim was never part of Petitions 11/2012 or 46/2012. Thus, it could not be retrofitted into an appeal arising out of those petitions.
Note: In fact, the Hon’ble Tribunal has confirmed that no pleadings, prayers, submissions, or issues relating to the 2014 deemed capacity claim exist anywhere in the proceedings giving rise to this appeal. - TSPL already pursued the 2014 claim separately and failed to amend arbitration. TSPL is bound by its choice to raise the 2014 claim in Petition 34/2015. PSPCL pointed out that the 2014 deemed-capacity claim appeared for the first time in Petition 34 of 2015, which was referred to arbitration. When TSPL later sought, in January 2024, to amend the arbitral pleadings to add this claim, the Arbitral Tribunal rejected the amendment on 31.07.2025, holding that the claim was outside the scope of the reference. Having failed in arbitration, TSPL could not now use this appeal as a substitute original forum.
- No jurisdiction can be created by alleged “admissions” or equitable pleas. PSPCL, clarified that it never admitted that the 2014 claim fell within this appeal. Any references made during arbitration were jurisdictional objections, not concessions. In any event, PSPCL argued, jurisdiction cannot arise from a party’s statement, and an appellate court cannot decide a dispute never adjudicated below.
- Jurisdiction cannot be created by assertions of “prejudice”: Even if an arbitral ruling constrains TSPL, the remedy lies in challenging the arbitral order, not reshaping the pending appeal.
- TSPL, under the pretext of seeking urgent listing, was in fact attempting to raise a new claim for capacity charges for the year 2014, a matter that was never decided by the State Commission, nor part of the present appeal. PSPCL emphasized that TSPL had not filed any application to amend its appeal under Order VI Rule 17 CPC, rendering the request procedurally defective.
Analysis and Conclusion
The Hon’ble Tribunal while appreciating the submissions of PSPCL took a view that the held that the claim sought to be introduced by TSPL was beyond the scope of the pending appeal and therefore not maintainable.
The Hon’ble Tribunal observed that the present appeal (Appeal No. 331 of 2016) emanates from the orders dated 06.09.2016 and 08.09.2016 passed by the State Commission in Petitions Nos. 11 and 46 of 2012, which themselves were remanded for limited reconsideration pursuant to the Tribunal’s earlier judgment dated 07.04.2016 in Appeal Nos. 56 and 84 of 2013. The issues in those proceedings were confined to the question of PSPCL’s obligation to execute the Fuel Supply Agreement (FSA) and the Fuel Transportation Agreement (FTA) with Mahanadi Coalfields Limited and the Indian Railways, respectively.
In contrast, the claim for deemed capacity charges for the year 2014 arose subsequently and was raised by TSPL for the first time in Petition No. 34 of 2015, which had been referred to arbitration by the State Commission vide order dated 07.12.2015. The Hon’ble Tribunal has duly observed that TSPL could not use the present appeal to cure that jurisdictional defect or bypass the arbitral rejection.
In light of the above, the concluded that the claim of appellant for deemed capacity charges pertaining to the year 2014 on account of alleged failure on the part of PSPCL to arrange adequate quantity as well as quality of coal for its power project is totally alien to this appeal and therefore, appellant cannot be permitted to file any pleadings/documents/data/submissions etc. with regards to the same in this appeal, as sought vide prayer (b) of the application.
Thus, the above Judgment reinforces a critical principle of appellate discipline, that parties cannot expand or reshape the scope of an appeal to introduce fresh causes of action never adjudicated by the original forum. It strengthens procedural certainty in regulatory litigation by affirming that jurisdiction must be rooted in the pleadings and statutory architecture not in afterthought claims or strategic manoeuvring.
Appeal made by:
Reeha Singh and Shirin Gupta
Represented by:
Poorva Saigal, Shubham Arya and Reeha Singh in – TSPL Case

The Anatomy of a PPA Dispute in India: From Notice to Remedy
Understanding Power Purchase Agreement Disputes in India
The power sector in India has evolved quite a bit lately, and Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) form the backbone of electricity generation and distribution. These contracts define how electricity generators, whether renewable or conventional, sell power to distribution companies (DISCOMs), ensuring commercial certainty and grid stability. However, as tariffs evolve, renewable targets expand, and regulatory frameworks tighten, power purchase agreement disputes in India have grown both in number and complexity.
A typical PPA dispute resolution in India can arise from multiple fault lines, including delays in project commissioning, disputes over tariff adjustments, curtailment of power by DISCOMs, or claims under the “Change in Law” clause. Each such disagreement can spiral into full-fledged regulatory litigation spanning multiple forums—from State Electricity Regulatory Commissions (SERCs) to the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (APTEL), and sometimes even the Supreme Court.
This article breaks down the litigation lifecycle of a PPA dispute in India—from the moment a notice is issued, through the maze of jurisdictional forums, to the final remedies available to aggrieved parties.
What Triggers PPA Disputes in India?
Disputes under Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) usually stem from mismatched expectations between generators and distribution licensees (DISCOMs), or from regulatory and operational challenges that disrupt project timelines and commercial viability.
Below are the most common triggers in PPA disputes in India:
1.Tariff Disputes
Tariff determination is one of the most litigated aspects of any electricity regulatory dispute in India.
Generators often lock in tariffs through competitive bidding or under cost-plus mechanisms approved by the State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC). Conflicts arise when:
- A DISCOM refuses to honour an agreed tariff, citing “unviable rates” or “change in circumstances.”
- The generator seeks tariff revision under the Change in Law clause due to new taxes, duties, or policy changes.
- Retrospective tariff reductions or renegotiations are attempted by state utilities, often seen in renewable energy PPAs (notably in Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat cases).
2.Commissioning Delays (COD) and Construction Hurdles
The Commercial Operation Date (COD) determines when the project is deemed ready to supply power. Delays in achieving COD, whether due to force majeure, delay in grid connectivity, or financing issues, often lead to disputes.
DISCOMs may impose Liquidated Damages (LDs) or encash Performance Bank Guarantees (PBGs), while developers may argue that delays were beyond their control, such as late evacuation approvals or right-of-way obstructions.
3.Curtailment of Power and Grid Backdowns
Curtailment refers to situations where DISCOMs refuse to schedule or offtake power even though it is available for supply.
While PPAs often guarantee “must-run” status for renewable plants, especially solar and wind, state load dispatch centres (SLDCs) sometimes curtail generation citing “grid security.”
Developers argue this amounts to a breach of PPA unless backed by valid technical grounds.
4.Change in Law and Policy Transitions
One of the most contentious areas in PPA dispute resolution in India involves the Change in Law clause. Introduction of new taxes (like GST), safeguard duties on solar modules, or changes in transmission regulations can significantly affect project economics.
Developers typically seek pass-through of these costs, while DISCOMs resist on procedural or interpretational grounds, leading to regulatory litigation.
Contractual Preconditions Before Litigation
Before a power purchase agreement dispute in India matures into a regulatory or arbitral proceeding, parties must navigate several contractual preconditions embedded in the PPA itself.
These clauses serve as both a compliance checklist and a procedural gatekeeper.
1.Conditions Precedent (CPs)
Most PPAs stipulate a list of Conditions Precedent (CPs) that the developer must fulfil before the agreement becomes fully operational. These may include:
- Achieving financial closure
- Securing land and statutory approvals
- Executing grid connectivity and transmission agreements
If CPs are not satisfied within the stipulated period, DISCOMs may terminate the PPA or encash the developer’s Performance Bank Guarantee (PBG). However, delays often stem from state authorities’ slow approvals—raising questions of equity and fairness.
2.Commercial Operation Date (COD)
The Commercial Operation Date marks the official commencement of power supply obligations.
Disputes arise when DISCOMs allege the project was not “ready for dispatch,” while developers argue that grid non-readiness delayed synchronization. Evidence such as grid inspection reports, testing certificates, and SLDC communication logs play a vital role in proving whether COD was legitimately achieved.
3.Liquidated Damages (LDs) and Performance Bank Guarantees (PBGs)
LDs are pre-agreed penalties for delay or non-performance, while PBGs act as financial security. DISCOMs often encash PBGs citing commissioning delays or breach of PPA.
Developers typically challenge such encashments as arbitrary or contrary to force majeure provisions. Regulatory bodies like CERC and SERCs have repeatedly held that LDs and PBGs cannot be enforced if delays stemmed from events beyond the developer’s control or if the utility itself contributed to the delay.
4.Notice and Cure Periods
Before initiating a formal claim or termination, PPAs generally require issuance of notice and allow a cure period for rectification. A failure to issue or properly serve notice can invalidate later proceedings.
These preconditions form the procedural foundation of every PPA dispute resolution in India. Observing them meticulously can prevent premature litigation and strengthen the developer’s case before the SERC or APTEL.
Forums & Hierarchy
The appropriate forum is critical in a power purchase agreement dispute in India, as jurisdiction determines both procedural timelines and the nature of available remedies. PPAs often contain arbitration clauses, but statutory disputes under electricity law can sometimes override contractual choices.
1.State Electricity Regulatory Commissions (SERCs)
SERCs are the first point of contact for most PPA disputes, particularly those involving:
- Tariff disagreements
- Claims for damages due to curtailment
- Enforcement of PPA obligations under the Electricity Act, 2003
SERCs have quasi-judicial powers to issue orders binding both generators and DISCOMs. Filing before a SERC is generally mandatory for disputes relating to regulated tariffs or grid operations, unless the PPA explicitly carves out arbitration for such claims.
2.Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (APTEL)
Aggrieved parties can appeal SERC orders to APTEL, which serves as the national-level appellate authority. Key characteristics include:
- National jurisdiction, addressing cross-state disputes
- Power to award damages, direct specific performance, or remand cases to SERCs
- Precedents set in APTEL PPA cases (e.g., Andhra Pradesh Solar PPA disputes) often guide future litigation
APTEL appeals are particularly common when SERC orders are perceived as inconsistent, delayed, or procedurally flawed.
3.Writ Jurisdiction
When parties believe statutory bodies have exceeded powers or violated fundamental rights, writ petitions under Article 226/32 of the Constitution may be filed in High Courts or the Supreme Court. These are exceptional remedies, usually pursued to secure:
- Stay of PPA termination
- Interim injunctions preventing encashment of PBGs
- Clarification on regulatory interpretation
4.Arbitration Carve-Outs
Some PPAs include arbitration clauses for commercial disputes. However, Indian courts have clarified that statutory obligations under the Electricity Act cannot be completely ousted by arbitration. Typically:
- Purely contractual claims (e.g., late payment penalties, indemnities) can go to arbitration
- Regulatory claims, tariff revision, or change-in-law disputes remain under SERC/APTEL jurisdiction
Evidence Strategy
In any power purchase agreement dispute in India, the strength of the case often hinges on meticulous evidence collection and presentation. Regulators and tribunals closely examine whether obligations were met, whether delays were excusable, and whether losses claimed are substantiated.
1.Grid Readiness and Evacuation Delays
One of the most frequent points of contention is whether the generator was ready to supply power and whether the DISCOM facilitated evacuation. Evidence includes:
- Grid synchronization certificates from the State Load Dispatch Center (SLDC)
- Communication logs for connectivity approvals
- Dispatch schedules showing actual versus scheduled generation
2.Metering and Energy Accounting Records
Accurate metering is critical to prove both delivery and shortfall of electricity. Documentation that regulators scrutinize includes:
- Meter calibration certificates
- Monthly energy accounting reports
- SLDC and DISCOM dispatch reconciliations
3.Force-Majeure Proof
Force majeure clauses protect generators from liability for events beyond their control. Commonly invoked scenarios are:
- Natural disasters (floods, cyclones)
- Grid failures beyond developer control
- Regulatory or policy delays
4.Documentary Trail of Notices and Communications
Every notice, email, or response related to contractual obligations, cure periods, or dispute escalation is crucial. A well-maintained documentary trail can:
- Prove that statutory and contractual preconditions were followed
- Demonstrate proactive mitigation efforts by the developer
- Strengthen claims before SERCs or APTEL
Conclusion
A power purchase agreement dispute in India is rarely a straightforward contract case—it sits at the intersection of regulatory oversight, commercial obligations, and public policy. Understanding the contractual framework, following procedural prerequisites, choosing the right forum, and building a sound evidentiary record are critical to securing relief.
For both developers and DISCOMs, proactive compliance and timely dispute management are the only sustainable strategies in India’s maturing power market.
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