The dispute centred around a Power Purchase Agreement(‘PPA’) signed between Punjab State Power Corporation Limited (‘PSPCL’) and Chadha Sugars and Industries Pvt. Ltd (‘Chadha Sugar’) for the supply of surplus power from Chadha Sugar’s 23 MW non-fossil fuel-based co-generation power project.
APTEL Reaffirms Statutory Primacy: Relinquishment Charges Upheld Despite Force Majeure
The dispute centred around the grant of Long-Term Access (‘LTA’) and the execution of a Bulk Power Transmission Agreement (‘BPTA’) between Aryan Renewable Energy Private Limited (‘Aryan Renewable’) and Central Transmission Utility (‘CTU’) for evacuation of power from Aryan Renewable’s proposed 1200 MW thermal power project at Amelia, Madhya Pradesh.
Background
Aryan Renewable proposed to set up a 1200 MW thermal power project in Madhya Pradesh and was granted LTA for the evacuation of power through the inter-State transmission system. Pursuant to the grant of LTA, a BPTA was executed, and the Appellant furnished a bank guarantee towards its transmission obligations.
Subsequently, the Central Water Commission declined to grant the No-Objection Certificate for water drawal, rendering the project non-implementable. Aryan Renewable contended that this constituted a force majeure event and that no unit of the generating station ever achieved commercial operation.
Thereafter, the bank guarantee submitted by Aryan Renewable were invoked, and the Central Electricity Regulation Commission (‘CERC’), vide the Impugned Order, held that Aryan Renewable remained liable to pay transmission and relinquishment charges under Regulation 18 of the Connectivity Regulations, 2009. Aggrieved, Aryan Renewable preferred an Appeal before the Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal.
Issues Framed by the Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal
- Whether Regulation 18 of the Connectivity Regulations, 2009 applies to a “zero-day failure” case, where LTA was never availed due to Force Majeure?
- Whether binding precedent by this Hon’ble Tribunal exists on the above
- Whether independently of precedent, the text of Regulation 18 contains a casus omissus regarding zero-use scenarios due to force majeure events, which is governed exclusively by the BPTA
- Whether Force Majeure under the BPTA overrides the statutory obligation to pay relinquishment charges under Regulation 18?
Analysis
Issue 1: Applicability of Regulation 18 to “zero-day failure”
1(a): Whether binding precedent exists
Aryan Renewable’s case primarily rests on Brahmani Thermal Power Private Limited v. CERC & Ors. passed by the Appellate Tribunal [Judgement dated 20.03.2025], where Regulation 18 was interpreted as—
(i) it applies solely to voluntary relinquishment of LTA “out of its wish”, having “no application” to compulsory exits due to unforeseeable force majeure events beyond control;
(ii) it presupposes actual stranded transmission capacity from such relinquishment, which is absent if lines are not commissioned or are utilised by others; and
(iii) LTA granted to generators activates only post-commercial operation, so no transmission charges liability arises where force majeure prevents project establishment altogether.
Aryan Renewable also relied on PEL Power Ltd. v. CERC and Himachal Sorang Power Pvt. Ltd. v. CERC, arguing that these decisions collectively constitute binding precedent excluding ‘zero-use’ cases from the scope of Regulation 18. The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal rejected this submission. It noted that the judgments relied upon did not consider the full statutory framework of the Connectivity Regulations, 2009, particularly the interrelationship between Regulations 14, 15 and 18. The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal held that the Brahmanijudgment impermissibly read additional words into Regulation 18 by restricting its application to voluntary relinquishment alone, contrary to settled principles of statutory interpretation. The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal reiterated that a judgment is binding only for what it actually decides, and observations made without consideration of relevant statutory provisions do not qualify.
1(b): Whether the text of Regulation 18 contains a casus omissus
Independently, Aryan Renewable contended that Regulation 18 uses the phrase “have availed access rights” in both its categories, implying the provision applies only where access has been operationalised, and that a zero-use case therefore, falls outside its scope as a casus omissus.
The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal rejected this contention. Through a harmonised reading of the definitions of ‘LTA’ and “long-term customer” under the Connectivity Regulations, 2009, the Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal held that the right to use the inter-State transmission system is conferred upon grant of LTA by the CTU, which is thereafter formalised through execution of the BPTA under Regulation 15. Regulation 14 was construed to distinguish between the grant of access and the date from which such access becomes operational.
The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal held that where access is relinquished after grant but before commissioning, the period of utilisation is necessarily zero years, which squarely falls within Regulation 18(1)(b), applicable to customers who have not availed access rights for at least twelve years. Consequently, the zero-day failure scenario is not an omitted case under the Regulations, and the plea of casus omissus was found to be without merit.
2. Whether Force Majeure under the BPTA overrides the statutory obligation to pay relinquishment charges under Regulation 18
Aryan Renewable argued that Clause of the BPTA dealing with force majeure operates as an overriding provision absolving it from all liabilities, including relinquishment charges. TheHon’ble Appellate Tribunal rejected this submission by emphasising the primacy of statutory regulations over contractual arrangements.
The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal relied on the Constitution Bench decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in PTC India Ltd. v. CERC to reiterate that regulations framed under Section 178 of the Electricity Act, 2003, have the force of subordinate legislation and override contractual provisions.
The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal further held that Clause of the BPTA merely exempts parties from claims for loss or damage arising from force majeure and does not extend to statutory transmission or relinquishment charges, which form part of a pooled, non-discriminatory transmission framework. Transmission charges are not payable to CTU alone but are shared among Designated ISTS Customers under the Sharing Regulations, and therefore cannot be characterised as contractual damages.
In the absence of a force majeure exception in Regulation 18 itself, and given the statutory treatment of the Connectivity Regulations, the Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal concluded that Clauses of the BPTA cannot override the obligation to pay relinquishment charges under Regulation 18(1)(b). The appeal was therefore, dismissed as being devoid of merit.
Conclusion
The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal judgment placed an emphasis on the statutory nature of the Connectivity Regulations 2009, making it clear that they were not to be superseded by the BPTA, and that there was no cassus omissus in Regulation 18 underlining the importance of construing the same in a harmonious matter.
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Sanctity Of The Bidding Documents And The Tariff Incorporated In The Ppa In Cases Where Accelerated Depreciation Has Been Availed By The Generator
The dispute revolves around the nature of depreciation availed by Mokia Green Energy Pvt. Ltd. (“Appellant”) and its consequent impact on tariff charged as per the Power Purchase Agreement (“PPA”) which was executed following a Request for Proposal (“RfP”) and Competitive Bidding Process. The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal vide its Judgement dated 08.01.2026 in Appeal 323 of 2025 has dismissed the appeal filed by the Appellant and held that tariff has to necessarily be reduced on availment of Accelerated Depreciation.
Background
In 2013, a RfP was issued by Punjab Electricity Development Agency (“PEDA”) where it was stipulated that if at any stage it is found that project availing normal rate of depreciation is claiming Accelerated Depreciation, then tariff would be revised as per the Punjab State Electricity Regulation Commission (“PSERC”) tariff applicable for Accelerated Depreciation, with effect from the date of commissioning.
The Appellant was one of the successful bidders and had declared that it will avail for normal rate of depreciation. Consequently, the Appellant and Punjab State Power Corporation Ltd. (“PSPCL”) entered into a PPA. However, later it was discovered that the Appellant was availing Accelerated Depreciation and, consequently PSPCL issued a notice of demand for reducing the applicable tariff. The Appellant had furnished a specific undertaking before signing the PPA that the Appellant will not avail Accelerated Depreciation.
Issues Framed by the Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal
- Whether the rate of depreciation, i.e. 80% claimed by the Appellant constitutes as Accelerated Depreciation?
- Assuming the Appellant had claimed accelerated depreciation, whether PSPCL can revise the tariff in the absence of a specific provision in the PPA?
- Whether PSPCL can direct the Appellant to pass on or refund any amount in the absence of any financial benefit having accrued to it?
Analysis
Issue 1: Accelerated Depreciation
The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal examined the scheme of Section 32 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (“IT Act”) and noted that it provides two alternative depreciation regimes. Depreciation under Section 32(1)(i), read with Appendix IA and Rule 5(1A) of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 (“IT Rules”), applies the straight-line method and prescribes a rate of 7.69% for solar power generating systems. In contrast, depreciation under Section 32(1)(ii), read with Appendix I and Rule 5(1) of the IT Rules, follows the written down value method and permits a substantially higher rate of depreciation of 80%/40%.
The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal held that the depreciation regime yielding higher depreciation in the initial years necessarily constitutes “accelerated depreciation”, and the absence of the express term in Section 32(1)(ii) does not alter its substantive character. Since the Appellant admittedly claimed depreciation under Section 32(1)(ii) at the rate of 80%/40%, it was rightly held to have availed accelerated depreciation.
Issue 2: Entire Agreement Clause in the PPA
In so far as arguments of the Appellant concerning “entire agreement” clause in the PPA, theHon’ble Appellate Tribunal emphasised that tariff is not a standalone numerical figure and cannot be read in isolation. It is inextricably linked to the competitive bidding process conducted pursuant to the RfP, and is therefore inherently subject to the terms and conditions stipulated therein.
The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal noted that the Preamble to the PPA expressly recognises the Implementation Agreement (“IA”), which unequivocally binds the Company to act in accordance with the terms of the RfP. In light of this contractual framework, it was held that the IA forms an inseparable part of the PPA, thereby binding the Appellant to the conditions of the RfP notwithstanding the presence of an “entire agreement” clause.
The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal further rejected the Appellant’s contention that the Undertaking, whereby it committed to avail only normal depreciation, ought to be read down in the event of inconsistency with the PPA. It was held that such an undertaking cannot be rendered redundant merely because the consequences of its breach were not expressly restated in the PPA. In the event of such a lacuna, the consequences must necessarily be imported from the bidding documents, which constitute the foundation of the contractual relationship.
Issue 3: Benefit Accrued on account of Accelerated Depreciation
The Appellant contended that even if it were held to have availed accelerated depreciation, no benefit was required to be passed on since it was a loss-making entity and had derived no actual financial gain. This contention was rejected on the ground that the accrual of benefit was immaterial. The RfP and the tariff determined by PSERC expressly provided for differential tariffs depending on whether accelerated depreciation was availed, irrespective of the generator’s profitability. Consequently, the tariff was required to be revised in accordance with the RfP, and the question of whether the Appellant had actually benefited from accelerated depreciation was held to be irrelevant.
Conclusion
The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal’s judgment underscores that generators are bound by their undertakings. It further reiterates the need for harmonious construction of contractual documents and affirms that tariff revision will follow in case the generators resile on their commitment to avail normal depreciation, independent of any actual benefit accrued by the generator.
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Supreme Court rules in favour of the Powergrid Corporation of India Limited reinforcing regulatory role of the Central Commission Under Electricity Act, 2003
The Supreme Court today (May 15) ruled that the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) is not precluded from exercising its functions under Section 79 of the Electricity Act, 2003 in the absence of regulations framed under Section 178 of the Electricity Act, 2003.
The Judgment arises out of the SLPs filed by Powergrid Corporation of India Limited (PGCIL) against the Order dated 25.02.2021 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh admitting the writ petitions filed by the Madhya Pradesh Power Transmission Company Limited (MPPTCL).
MPPTCL had filed the Writ Petition before the High Court on the ground that the CERC had exercised powers beyond its jurisdiction as per the regulations notified under Section 178 of the Electricity Act, 2003 while passing the orders dated 21.01.2020 and 27.01.2020 in Petition No. 311/TT/2018 and Petition No. 266/TT/2018 filed by PGCIL seeking transmission tariff for its assets.
While setting aside the judgment dated 25.02.2021 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, the Supreme Court answered the following questions in favour of PGCIL:
i. Whether the CERC, while exercising its functions under Section 79(1) of the Act, 2003, is circumscribed by statutory regulations enacted under Section 178 of the Act, 2003?
ii. Whether the CERC exercises regulatory or adjudicatory functions under Section 79 of the Act, 2003? In other words, what is the scope of the CERC’s power to regulate inter-state transmission of electricity and determine tariff for the same under clauses (c) and (d) of Section 79(1)?
iii. Whether the grant of compensation by the CERC for the delay vide the orders dated 21.01.2020 and 27.01.2020 respectively, is a regulatory or adjudicatory function and to what extent are the principles of natural justice applicable to the exercise of such functions?
iv. Whether the High Court was justified in admitting the writ petition filed by the respondent no. 1 herein challenging the order dated 21.01.2020 of the CERC when there existed an alternative remedy under Section 111 of the Act, 2003?
While dealing with the above questions, the Supreme Court has held as under:
a. CERC functions as both – decision-making and regulation-making authority under Section 79 and 178 of the Act, 2003 respectively.
b. While noting the Constitution Bench judgment in PTC India Limited v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (2010) 4 SCC 603, the Supreme Court has held that the Regulations under Section 178 has the effect of interfering with and overriding contractual relationships between the regulated entities, however, on the other hand the orders under Section 79 have to be confined to the existing statutory regulations and do not have the effect of altering the terms of contract between the specific parties before the CERC
c. In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in PTC and Energy Watchdog v. CERC reported in (2017) 14 SCC 80, it has been held that the absence of a regulation under Section 178 does not preclude the CERC from exercising its powers under Section 79(1) to make specific regulations or pass orders between the parties before it.
d. In the present case, the Supreme Court held that there is no contractual clause between the parties for establishing the risks of delay in commissioning of a transmission asset. There is also no uniform settled position as regards the liability of transmission charges payable before a particular transmission element is put in operation, in the form of regulations under Section 178. These circumstances, considered together with the prohibition on imposing liability of delayed payments on beneficiaries, leave a regulatory gap. The Supreme Court then proceeded to hold that in light of the dictum in the case of Energy Watchdog case, in the situation of an absence in Regulation, Guidelines or Contractual clauses, the Act, 2003 mandates that the CERC may strike a judicious balance keeping in mind commercial principles and consumers interest in exercise of its general regulatory powers under Section 79.
e. The Supreme Court further held that sources of power for enactment of a regulation under Section 178 and regulatory order under Section 79(1) are different. The former emanates from the power of delegated legislation whereas the latter is an ad hoc power which is limited to the specific parties and situation in context of which the order is given. Since the regulatory powers under Section 79(1) are of an ad hoc nature and are not of general application, the orders thereunder are made appealable under Section 111.
In light of the above findings, the Supreme Court held that CERC is empowered to order for imposition of transmission charges on the party to whom delay is attributable and there was no occasion for High Court to admit the Writ Petitions and CERC . The Supreme Court has concluded that APTEL is the appropriate authority to look into the merits of the matter should MPPTCL choose to prefer an appeal before APTEL under Section 111 of the Act, 2003.
The copy of the judgment has been directed to be circulated to all High Courts.
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Supreme Court Upholds State Regulatory Oversight Over Inter-State Power Procurement Affecting Local Grid
The Supreme Court affirms that State Commissions can regulate inter-state electricity procurement affecting local grids. A landmark interpretation under the Electricity Act, 2003.
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Tribunal Upholds Defaulter Pays Principle: Powergrid Wins TANTRANSCO Appeal
On 11.12.2024, the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity ruled in favor of Powergrid, upholding the Defaulter Pays Principle and TANTRANSCO’s liability for 50% transmission charges due to delays in the KPFBR Project. The judgment reaffirms that true-up proceedings cannot revisit settled tariff principles and underscores the Central Commission’s regulatory authority.
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Appellate Tribunal of Electricity in the case of Punjab State Power Corporation Limited vs. Chadha Sugars & Industries Pvt. Ltd& Ors.
APTEL's Decision on Tariff Reduction in PSPCL vs. Chadha Sugars
Background
PSPCL issued a Demand Notice to Chadha Sugar stating that Chadha Sugar had availed Accelerated Depreciation under the Income Tax Act, 1961. According to the PPA and the applicable tariff order, availing Accelerated Depreciation necessitated a reduction in the tariff payable to Chadha Sugar by Rs. 0.18 per unit.
Chadha Sugar contested the demand notice, arguing that they had not benefited from the accelerated depreciation due to sustained losses. They also contended that PSPCL required confirmation from the Punjab Energy Development Agency (‘PEDA’) before revising the tariff, as stipulated in the PPA.
The State Commission on the issue of reduction of tariff on account of availing Accelerated Depreciation held that the demand notice is not in accordance with the PPA as Article 2.1 specifies ‘Section 80(1)(A) of the Income Tax Act’, whereas, Chadha Sugar had availed Accelerated Depreciation under Section 32 of the Income Tax Act and directed PSPCL to refund the amount along with the applicable late payment surcharge.
Issues Framed by the Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal
- Whether a lower tariff was payable by PSPCL considering Chadha Sugar had availed Accelerated Depreciation.
- Whether confirmation from PEDA was required for the application of a reduced tariff upon Chadha Sugar exercising the option of availing Accelerated Depreciation.
Analysis
Issue 1: Benefit of Accelerated Depreciation
The Appellate Tribunal noted that Section 32 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, governs depreciation, with companies having the option to choose between normal depreciation (straight-line method) and accelerated depreciation (written-down value method). This choice, once exercised, is irreversible and applies to all subsequent years.
The generic tariff order issued by the State Commission in 2010 had established a specific reduction in tariff (Rs. 0.18/kWh) for generating companies opting for accelerated depreciation. This reduction applied irrespective of the actual profit or loss incurred by the company.
The Appellate Tribunal emphasised that Chadha Sugar was aware of this provision, as evidenced by their undertaking, where they agreed to inform PSPCL and comply with the reduced tariff if they chose to avail accelerated depreciation in the future. Furthermore, the PPA itself stipulated a reduced tariff of Rs. 4.39/kWh in case Chadha Sugar availed Accelerated Depreciation.
The Appellate Tribunal rejected Chadha Sugar’s argument that the tariff reduction was inapplicable because they had not realised any actual benefits from the accelerated depreciation. The Tribunal clarified that the “benefit” in this context referred to the pre-defined, quantifiable reduction in tariff (Rs. 0.18/kWh), not the company’s overall financial performance.
The Appellate Tribunal concluded that allowing a generating company to switch between normal and reduced tariffs based on their profit or loss would create an absurd situation.
Issue 2: PEDA Confirmation
Chadha Sugar had argued that PSPCL required confirmation from PEDA before revising the tariff. The PPA stated that if a company was found to have availed benefits like Accelerated Depreciation or subsidies despite providing an undertaking to the contrary, PSPCL, after confirmation from PEDA, would revise the tariff.
The Appellate Tribunal concluded that the above-mentioned clause has to be read in conjunction with other relevant clauses in the PPA. Article 2.1.1(i) and (ii) of the PPA defined the applicable tariffs payable by PSPCL to Chadha Sugar, with no mention of any prerequisite PEDA certification. The financial impact of opting for accelerated depreciation was pre-determined and agreed upon by both parties, negating the need for further financial impact assessment.
Article 2.1.1(iii) of the PPA specifically addressed grants and subsidies, mandating PEDA confirmation regarding the amount claimed by the company and the financial impact to be incorporated into the tariff. The Appellate Tribunal noted that this distinction stemmed from PEDA’s role as the nodal agency for renewable energy, making them privy to information about subsidies and grants.
Conclusion
The Appellate Tribunal judgment emphasised that the quantifiable benefits associated with specific provisions, such as Accelerated Depreciation, are pre-defined and not contingent on the company’s overall financial performance.
The judgment also underscored the importance of reading contractual clauses in harmony with each other to arrive at a coherent and consistent interpretation.
Unjust Levy Of Poc Charges: The Appellate Tribunal For Electricity Secures Refunds And Interest For Haryana Consumers
Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Limited & Ors. V. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission and Ors. – Review Petition No. 3 Of 2024
In a significant ruling on 18.11.2024 in Review Petition No. 3 of 2024, the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity has upheld the rights of Haryana Discoms in their prolonged legal battle over unjustly levied Point of Connection (‘POC’) charges. The Tribunal directed a refund of these charges, along with applicable interest, to be passed on to consumers through tariff adjustments. This judgment not only rectifies the financial burden on Haryana Discoms but also sets a precedent for equitable resolution in disputes involving transmission charges. By emphasizing practical and consumer-centric methodologies, the Tribunal’s decision ensures fairness while addressing logistical challenges in refund disbursements.
Facts Of The Case:
Haryana Discoms has been paying the Transmission Charges for the 400 kV Transmission Line from Aravali Power Station to Daulatabad (‘Transmission Line’) as decided by the Haryana Electricity Regulatory Commission since the commissioning of the transmission line in March 2011. Thereafter, the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (‘Central Commission’) notified the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (Sharing of Inter State Transmission Charges and Losses) Regulations, 2010 (‘Sharing Regulations’), which came into effect from 01.07.2011.
The aforementioned Regulations are applicable to Inter-State Transmission system (‘ISTS’) customers who use the ISTS or are connected to the ISTS only. Power System Operation Corporation Limited (‘POSOCO’) and Central Transmission Utility (‘CTU’) (then forming part of POWERGRID) started including the above Transmission Line in the bills raised on Haryana Discoms for payment of transmission charges, under the Sharing Regulations notified by the Central Commission.
Haryana Discoms after being made aware that the Transmission Line was being treated as an ISTS Line, approached the Central Commission by way of Petition No. 126/MP/2017. The Central Commission, after examining the provisions of Section 2(36) of the Electricity Act, 2003; Connectivity Regulations; Sharing Regulations as well as the Grid Code unequivocally vide its Order dated 04.05.2008 held that no inter-state transmission charges are payable by Haryana Discoms for the use of the Transmission Line as the same is an Intra State Line and not an ISTS, as claimed by POSOCO/CTU. However, the Central Commission only granted prospective relief with effect from the date of passing of the Order 04.05.2018.
Aggrieved by the restrictive prospective application of the Order dated 04.05.2018, Haryana Discoms filed an Appeal being No. 240 of 2018 before this Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal claiming a refund from July 2011 onwards along with carrying cost. The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal passed an Order dated 04.02.2020 remanding the matter to the Central Commission for re-consideration. Thereafter the Central Commission passed the Order dated 30.07.2022 in Petition 126/MP/2017 upholding the stand taken in its earlier Order dated 04.05.2018.
Aggrieved by the decision of the Central Commission, Haryana Discoms filed Appeal 383 of 2023 before the Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal seeking the setting aside of the Order dated 30.07.2022 and the refund of POC charges along with carrying cost.
The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal vide Order dated 02.02.204, set aside the Order of the Central Commission dated 30.07.2022 and remanded the matter to the Central Commission for the refund to be initiated after quantification while granting the relief to Haryana Discoms until 3 years prior to the filing of the Petition. While passing the aforesaid Order, the Appellate Tribunal had further directed the Central Commission to refund the POC charges to the identified individual consumers in the State of Haryana and no finding on the claim for interest/carrying cost as prayed for by the Appellants was rendered.
Aggrieved of the aforesaid, the Haryana Discomsfiled a Review Petition before the Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal on the following two aspects:
Methodology For Refund Adjustment
Haryana Discoms highlighted the difficulty in identifying and refunding individual consumers from past years due to the large and dynamic consumer base, which has grown from approximately 53.81 lakh in 2014 to 78.57 lakh in 2024. Many past consumers may no longer be part of the current consumer body, making direct refunds impractical. Reference was made to Regulation 67 of the HERC Tariff Regulations, which provides a methodology for adjusting prior period income. Given this, they proposed that the quantified refund amount be incorporated into the revenue requirements of the current year. Haryana Discoms emphasized that this approach ensures that the refund benefits are automatically passed on to the existing consumer base through a reduction in retail tariffs. Haryana Discoms argued that this established methodology is consistent with regulatory practices and addresses the logistical challenges of tracing individual past consumers while ensuring fairness to all current consumers in the State of Haryana.
Interest on Refunds
Haryana Discoms contended that they should be restored to their original economic position and emphasized that any amount realized, including interest, would not be retained but adjusted in favour of Haryana’s consumers. Haryana Discoms argued that several judgments have established that interest is a natural consequence of granting relief.
Decision Of The Hon’ble Tribunal
In light of the above-challenged aspects, the Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal has been pleased to allow the Review Petition filed by Haryana Discoms to make the following determinations regarding the refund of POC charges to Haryana Discoms:
- Refund to Consumers via Tariff Adjustment: The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal has held that, since Haryana Discoms were required to pass on both the costs and benefits of the POC charges to their consumers, the Central Commission should not attempt to refund individual customers. Instead, the benefits of the refund should be passed on to consumers via a lower tariff through the ARR to be determined by the HERC, post receipt of the monies from POSOCO.
- Admissibility of Interest/Carrying Costs: The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal was pleased to hold that since there was both a plea and a prayer for interest/carrying costs in all of the proceedings after the initial Petition and the same was nowhere disputed by CTU/POSCO, the relief towards the same was admissible to Haryana Discoms. The Hon’ble Tribunal also concluded that having illegally levied charges, POSOCO/CTU have to refund the amount with applicable interest
- Entitlement to Interest: The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal then discussed whether the Haryana Discoms were entitled to interest/carrying costs. It further held that Haryana Discoms were indeed entitled to interest on the amount to be refunded because they had been deprived of the use of that money while the case proceeded.
- Determination of Principal and Interest: The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal has now remanded the case to the Central Commission to determine the principal amount to be refunded along with the appropriate rate of interest on a simple or compound basis within a stipulated time period of four months.
- Directives to CTU and POSOCO: In addition to determining the interest rate, the Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal directed the Central Commission to issue appropriate directions to CTU and POSOCO to pay the refund along with interest to Haryana Discoms.
- Tariff Adjustment: Finally, the Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal ordered Haryana Discoms to adjust their tariff in the next tariff determination to pass on the benefits of the refund and interest to consumers.
Conclusion
The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal for Electricity has held that POSOCO/CTU acted unlawfully in raising and collecting Inter-State Transmission Charges from Haryana Discoms in relation to an Intra-State Transmission Line. Furthermore, the Tribunal prescribed a methodology for adjusting past refunds in the forthcoming ARR, noting that it is impractical to allocate the costs and benefits of POC charges to individual consumers. This approach is not only time- and cost-efficient but also more pragmatic and conclusive.
Central Electricity Regulatory Commission Has The Power To Execute Its Own Orders Under The Garb Of Section 79 Of The Electricity Act, 2003
A Legal Analysis of Wage Inequality and the Quest for Equal Remuneration
On 17.10.2024, the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (‘Central Commission’)directed Tamil Nadu Transmission Corporation Limited (‘TANTRANSCO’) to pay its outstanding transmission charges along with applicable Late Payment Surcharge to Power Grid Corporation of India Limited (‘POWERGRID’).
Factual Background
POWERGRID had been entrusted with the responsibility of setting up certain elements that are part of the transmission system associated with the Kalpakkam PFBR 500 MW project. Consequently, POWERGRID approached the Central Commission seeking approval of the transmission tariff for three assets associated with the said system that was being set up by it.
The Central Commission vide its Tariff Order dated 04.03.2021, approved the date of commercial operation of the said asset as 01.04.2014. It was further directed that the Transmission Charges from the said date would be borne by the generating company – BHAVINI and the transmission licensee – TANTRANSCO in equal proportion until either the generation by BHAVINI or the transmission system set up by TANTRANSCO is commissioned.
Pursuant to the above-mentioned Order dated 04.03.2021, bilateral invoices were raised on TANTRANSCO.
Thereafter, POWERGRID approached the Central Commission for truing up of the transmission tariff for the 2014-19 period and determination of the transmission tariff for the 2019-24 period. The Central Commission vide its order dated 05.12.2021 trued up the transmission tariff for the 2014-19 period. Subsequent to the passing of the aforementioned True-UpOrder, the final invoice was raised on TANTRANSCO.
As TANTRANSCO failed to make the payment within the stipulated time in terms of the final invoice raised, POWERGRID filed a Petition before the Central Commission under Section 79 of the Electricity Act, 2003 for the execution of the Tariff Order dated 04.03.2021.
Submissions Of Powergrid
- TANTRANSCO has continuously defaulted in complying with the Tariff Order. Subsequent to the Tariff Order, bilateral invoices were raised on TANTRANSCO. However, even after several notices, TANTRANSCO has not paid the outstanding dues.
- No Appeal or Review has been preferred against the Tariff Order by TANTRANSCO.
- POWERGRID has no contractual mechanism to enforce the recoveries against TANTRANSCO. There is no bank guarantee or Letter of Credit available with PGCIL for encashment to recover the outstanding dues.
- The Central Commission is vested with the powers of civil courts and therefore, it can execute its own orders under Regulation 119 of the Conduct of Business Regulations, 1999.
- The Central Commission exercises regulatory powers under Section 79 of the Act which includes within its scope the power to enforce and implement its orders and can initiate suo-moto action under Section 142 of the Electricity Act, 2003 in the event of any non-compliance of regulation or the orders of Commission.
Analysis And Conclusion
The Central Commission observed in its Order that although Section 79 of the Electricity Act, 2003 does not specifically elaborate on the execution of orders passed by the Commission, it nevertheless enables the Commission to regulate the Inter-State Transmission of Electricity, to determine its tariff and also to adjudicate upon the disputes in connection therewith.
Relying upon the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Central Power Distribution Co. & Ors. v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission &Ors., (2007) 8 SCC 197the Central Commission observed that the power to regulate also includes within it the power to enforce.
Reliance was also placed upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Ltd. v. Maharashtra State Electricity Regulation Commission & Ors. (2022) 4 SCC 657wherein it was observed that the Electricity Regulatory Commissions constituted under the Electricity Act, 2003 are to be seen as substitutes for civil courts in relation to disputes between the licensees and the generating companies. Therefore, the Commissions would have the power to execute their own orders.
The Central Commission rejected the contention of TANTRANSCO that POWERGRID failed to avail appropriate remedies under Section 142 of the Electricity Act, 2003. The Central Commission observed that invoking the provisions of Section 142 for non-compliance of an order is not the sine qua non in enforcement proceedings and is simply one of the means of ensuring compliance.
Further, the Central Commission has also observed that the truing-up exercise is not an independent exercise but is in furtherance to the determination of tariff under the tariff order. Merely because the applicable transmission charges for the said asset have undergone revision due to the truing-up exercise, it does not render the tariff order, especially the directions issued thereunder, non-executable or unenforceable.
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NCLAT Ruling: NCLAT Directs Resolution Professional to Settle Outstanding Electricity Dues Under IBC
The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) continues to play a critical role in shaping the implementation of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC). In a recent NCLAT ruling, the Delhi Bench of NCLAT, led by Justice Ashok Bhushan, addressed a significant issue regarding the payment of electricity dues incurred by the Corporate Debtor during the moratorium period of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP). This case involved Earthcon Infracon Pvt. Ltd., which was under CIRP, and Noida Power Company Ltd. (NPCL), raising concerns about whether current dues must be settled even during the protective moratorium phase provided by Section 14(1) of the IBC.
The NCLAT ruling sheds light on the responsibilities of the Resolution Professional (RP) in managing ongoing dues during insolvency proceedings, ensuring that essential utilities like electricity are not disrupted, provided there is no default in the payment of current dues.
Background of the Case
The case arose when Earthcon Infracon Pvt. Ltd. (Corporate Debtor) entered into the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP), and a Resolution Professional (RP) was appointed to manage its affairs during the moratorium period. During this time, Noida Power Company Ltd. (NPCL) issued multiple notices regarding the non-payment of post-CIRP electricity dues. The RP initially sought relief from the Adjudicating Authority, requesting that the electricity not be disconnected and proposing an instalment plan for the dues.
Despite the interim orders passed by the Adjudicating Authority, preventing NPCL from disconnecting the electricity, the issue escalated as no resolution for the payment schedule was reached. NPCL filed further applications to vacate the interim orders, and the RP filed applications to permanently stay NPCL’s disconnection notices.
Eventually, the NCLAT ruling ordered that the RP should collect electricity dues from the homebuyers and remit them to NPCL. It was also directed that the RP could take necessary steps in case of non-payment. However, the issue of electricity disconnection for common areas such as lifts and corridors remained under dispute, leading to additional hearings and orders from the Adjudicating Authority.
NCLAT Ruling: Key Legal Issues
The core issue before the Tribunal was whether the Appellant, Noida Power Company Ltd. (NPCL), was lawfully entitled to demand payment of current electricity dues incurred by the Corporate Debtor during the moratorium period. Additionally, NPCL sought to determine whether it had the right to disconnect the electricity connection if the dues remained unpaid.
The NCLAT ruling clarified that while the Corporate Debtor is under the protective shield of the moratorium as outlined in Section 14(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), this protection does not absolve the debtor from paying current dues. The Tribunal highlighted that the benefit of continued electricity supply, or any essential utility, is contingent upon there being no default in the payment of current dues. Therefore, the Resolution Professional (RP) has an obligation to ensure these payments are made to avoid disruptions.
In this specific NCLAT ruling, the Tribunal referred to previous judgements, including Shailesh Verma vs Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company and Sanskriti Allottee Welfare Association & Ors vs Gaurav Katiyar, both of which established that the RP is responsible for the settlement of such dues. These cases underscored the importance of ensuring that utilities remain functional while the Corporate Debtor undergoes insolvency resolution, but only when current dues are settled.
Impact of the NCLAT Ruling
This NCLAT ruling has significant implications for both Resolution Professionals (RP) and creditors, particularly utility providers like electricity companies. It reinforces the principle that while the moratorium under Section 14(1) of the IBC protects the Corporate Debtor from legal actions during the insolvency process, this protection is conditional upon the payment of ongoing dues.
For Resolution Professionals, the NCLAT ruling serves as a reminder of their duty to manage not only the debtor’s assets but also to ensure that essential services like electricity, which are critical to the operation of the Corporate Debtor, are maintained. Failing to pay such dues can lead to the discontinuation of services, which could further complicate the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP). Moreover, the Tribunal’s reliance on past rulings reaffirms the obligation of the RP to collect dues from residents or other stakeholders when needed, as seen in this case with the homebuyers.
On the other hand, utility companies are assured that they are entitled to receive payments for services rendered during the CIRP. The NCLAT ruling makes it clear that utility providers are not obligated to continue offering their services free of charge, even when the Corporate Debtor is under moratorium protection, provided there are unpaid current dues.
Conclusion
The recent NCLAT ruling involving Noida Power Company Ltd. and Earthcon Infracon Pvt. Ltd. highlights the delicate balance between protecting the interests of the Corporate Debtor during insolvency and ensuring that current dues, such as electricity payments, are not neglected. By directing the Resolution Professional to pay the outstanding electricity dues or arrange a phased payment plan, the Tribunal has emphasized the importance of maintaining essential services while ensuring that obligations are met.
This NCLAT ruling serves as a precedent for future cases involving utility dues during the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP). It underscores the role of the Resolution Professional in safeguarding the debtor’s operations while simultaneously addressing the rights of creditors, including utility providers. Ultimately, the decision provides clarity on how Section 14(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) should be interpreted in relation to ongoing financial obligations during the moratorium period.
The Power Purchase Agreement is a Sacroscant Document and Its Provisions are Binding on the Parties
In a recent case, the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity vide its Judgement dated 24.09.2024 has upheld the decision passed by the Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission (‘State Commission’) holding that in the absence of requisite mandatory Notices under the Power Purchase Agreement (‘PPA’), the Generator was responsible for the delay in commissioning the Project.
Arjun Green Power Private Limited (‘Arjun Green’), a Solar developer in the State of Rajasthan, challenged the Order passed by the State Commission, wherein, the State Commission rejected the prayer made by Arjun Green to extend the SCOD and increase in Tariff.
Background
Arjun Green and Rajasthan Renewable Energy Corporation Limited (‘RREC’) entered into a PPA on the term that the SCOD was to be achieved within 12 months of the signing of the PPA.
The SCOD was extended from time to time till 21.02.2018. After the expiry of final extension, Arjun Green requested the Rajasthan Utilities to commission the Project. Rajasthan Utilities rejected the request on the ground that the extension period has expired and advised Arjun Green to approach the State Commission for the same.
Accordingly, Arjun Green approached the State Commission pursuant to which directions were given to the Rajasthan Utilities to form a committee for commissioning of the Project, and thereafter, the Project was commissioned after a delay of 3 months from the SCOD.
Since, there was a delay in commissioning of the Project, the Rajasthan Utilities imposed Liquidated Damages on Arjun Green on account of delay in commissioning of the Project. The said project got commissioned in the next financial year and Article 9 of the PPA stipulated that consequence of delay in commissioning of the project shall change the tariff and the tariff applicable at the time of commissioning of the project shall apply. In accordance with Article 9 of the PPA and the Tariff Order passed by the State Commission, the tariff for power generated and supplied by Arjun Green to Rajasthan Utilities was also reduced.
Consequently, Arjun Green approached the State Commission seeking extension of SCOD and claiming increase in the Tariff.
The State Commission dismissed the Petition filed by Arjun Green on the grounds that delay was attributable to Arjun Green and the reduction in Tariff is in accordance with the provisions of the PPA.
Arjun Green challenged the Order passed by the State Commission before the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity on the ground that Arjun Green had intimated the Rajasthan Utilities before the SCOD and the delay caused thereafter is not attributable to Arjun Green.
Rajasthan Utilities contended that issuance of Notice in the present case to the concerned authority is a mandatory requisite. In terms of the PPA, Arjun Green had to give a preliminary written notice at least 60 days in advance and final written notice of at least 30 days in advance of the date on which it intends to synchronize the Plant to the Grid, whereas, in the present case, Arjun Green has failed to issue any such notices.
Further, Article 9 of the PPA clearly stipulates that in case of delay in commissioning of the Project, agreed tariff or the applicable tariff in terms of the State Commission’s regulation for that year, whichever is lower will be paid to the power producer. The above Article does not make any distinction for the reasons for which the Project is delayed, namely, whether the same is on account of reasons attributable to Arjun Green or otherwise. Therefore, irrespective of the reasons for delay, Arjun Green would only be entitled to the tariff for the year in which the Project is actually commissioned.
Conclusion
The Appellate Tribunal observed that the present issue is no longer res-integra and has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its various judgements wherein it was held that PPA is a sacrosanct document and binding upon the parties. All the rights and obligations of the parties flow from the provisions of the PPA and the timelines given therein are to be adhered to. The Appellate Tribunal has made it absolute that the timelines given in a PPA have a purpose and are not a mere empty formality. Therefore, the parties cannot be given any liberty to bypass such mandatory provisions. In view of the delay, the Appellate Tribunal has also upheld the imposition of liquidated damages on the Developer.
R Associates represented Rajasthan Urja Vikas Nigam Limited through Adv. Poorva Saigal and Adv. Shubha Arya.